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Federal Discretion in the Prosecution of Local
Political Corruption
Andrew T. Baxter*
Federal prosecutors' awareness of political corruption at the state and
local levels has recently increased concomitantly to the incidence of disclo-
sures and prosecutions of similar corruption at the federal level. Because
local law enforcement officials have frequently been unable or unwilling to
pursue local political corruption, federal prosecutors have increasingly as-
sumed responsibility for the policing of non-federal political criminal ac-
tivity, even in the absence of definitive statutory grounds.
In this article, the author examines the legal basis upon which federal
prosecution of local political corruption is conducted. It is asserted that
existing federal judicial and legislative limitations provide an inexact
foundation for federal prosecution and, in actuality, promote potentially
unconstitutional discretion on the part of federal prosecutors who pursue
local corruption. The article identifies several constitutional issues arising
from this prosecutorial discretion, especially noting the areas of the sepa-
ration of powers and other federalism concepts. The article concludes with
suggestions for means of limiting the discretion of federal prosecutors in
the pursuit of non-federal political corruption.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the early 1970's, federal prosecutors began to target local
political corruption1 as a major federal law enforcement priority.2
* A.B. 1978, Princeton University, J.D. 1981, Harvard University. Associate,
Morgan, Lewis and Backus, Philadelphia, Pa. Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
1. This paper focuses on federal prosecution of state and local officials for
corrupt conduct such as extortion and bribery. The term "local corruption" will be
used to refer to this type of criminal activity.
2. In 1975, the Chief of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice
(hereinafter DOJ) revealed that "conscious efforts are presently being exerted by
the Department ... to bring federal investigative and prosecutorial resources to
bear in increasing quantity and quality in the area of governmental and institu-
tional integrity." Thornburgh, Preface to the United States Courts of Appeals:
1974-75 Term Criminal Law and Procedure, 64 GEO. LJ. 173 (1975).
In 1977, the Chief of the Public Integrity Section of the DOJ stated that
"[fIederal prosecutors during the last decade [have begun] to assume a much
more active ... role in attempting to use federal statutes to attack corruption at
the state and local level." Henderson, The Expanding Role of Federal Prosecutors
in Combating State and Local Political Corruption, 8 Cm. L REV. 385, 386 (1977).
See also, e.g., Harrington Target: White Collar Crime, Boston Evening Globe, Oct.
Federal prosecutors believed that "corrupt schemes at the state
and local level. . . [were] at least as corrosive of the governmen-
tal process as corruption at the federal level." 3 They determined
that vigorous federal enforcement efforts were "required to fill a
vacuum created by the inability or unwillingness of state and lo-
cal law enforcement agencies to deal adequately with the task of
ferreting out corruption." 4
Faced with an inadequate statutory basis for prosecuting cor-
rupt local officials, federal enforcement officials began to apply
four federal statutes which traditionally had been applied to other
forms of criminal activity:5 the Hobbs Act,6 the Mail Fraud Act,7
the Travel Act,8 and most significantly, the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).9 The interpretations of
the general language of the four statutes advanced by federal
prosecutors have been described by many Justice Department of-
ficials as "creative"' 0 and by others as inconsistent with the legis-
lative intent." Nonetheless, the federal courts generally validated
3, 1978, at 3 (Boston U.S. Attorney declared governmental corruption a district en-
forcement priority) [hereinafter cited as Boston Evening Globe].
Charles Ruff, a former DOJ and United States Attorney (hereinafter USA), ar-
gues that local USA's, largely independent of the DOJ, provided the impetus for
the earliest federal prosecutions of local political corruption. He describes how
the DOJ has recently attempted to exert greater control over prosecution of local
corruption by USA's. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study
in the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEo. L.J. 1171, 1177, 1205-06, 1211-12
(1977). Sections I and II do not attempt to distinguish the allocation of discretion-
ary power between the DOJ in Washington and the USA's. The text refers to
these entities together as "federal prosecutors." Section IV(C) makes a greater ef-
fort to distinguish the powers and functions of the DOJ from its local prosecuting
arms.
3. Henderson, supra note 2, at 386.
4. Thornburgh, supra note 2, at 173.
5. As Thornburgh describes, "federal prosecutors [cast] about for new tools
to deal with corrupt activities in ... the public sector." Id.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976). See infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976). See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1970). This was part of Title IX of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970.
10. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 2, at 386; Thornburgh, supra note 2, at 173-
74. The interpretations advanced by the DOJ are described therein as "creative,"
"innovative," "imaginative," and "expansive."
11. Charles Ruff argues that the application of the "color of right" language of
the Hobbs Act to local corruption is inconsistent with the intent of its drafters.
Ruff, supra note 2, at 1175.
Lee Radek, an attorney in the Public Integrity Section of the DOJ, acknowl-
edged that the Department's interpretations of the Hobbs Act and the Mail Fraud
Act probably transcend the intent of the drafters. He also acknowledged that the
inclusion of state and local governmental units as "enterprises" under RICO-an
interpretation advanced by the DOJ-was probably not intended by the drafters.
Radek argued, however, that the Department's interpretations of these statutes
are within the broad, general language of the statutes. Interview with Lee Radek,
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the application of these statutes to local corruption. 12 Encouraged
by continuing judicial acquiescence, federal prosecutors dramati-
cally escalated their efforts to police local corruption in the follow-
ing decade.13
The brief history of federal prosecution of local political corrup-
tion indicates that federal prosecutors have enjoyed broad discre-
tion in developing and implementing, unilaterally, federal law
enforcement policy. "Discretion" has been defined by James Vor-
enberg as "the room left for subjective judgment [concerning]
statutes, administrative rules, judicial decision, social patterns
and institutional pressures which bear on an official's decision."1 4
This article will examine the process whereby federal prosecu-
tors have managed to formulate and execute a policy of vigorous
federal prosecution of local corruption which has remained free of
substantial legislative and judicial limitations. Section II reviews
the insubstantial legislative and judicial limitations on federal
prosecutorial discretion in the local corruption context. Section
III discusses several concerns based on the constitutional notions
of the separation of powers and federalism. Section IV examines
various ways in which federal discretion in the prosecution of lo-
cal corruption should be narrowed. The recent efforts of Congress
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to narrow and guide
prosecutorial discretion are evaluated in Section IV.
II. SCOPE OF FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION TO DEVELOP
POLICY IN THE LOCAL CORRUPTION CONTEXT
The limits on prosecutorial discretion to make federal law en-
forcement policy in the local corruption context, consisting of
only open-ended statutory language permissively construed by
federal courts, are not very confining. Additionally, neither the
Department of Justice, Public Integrity Section, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 12,
1980) [hereinafter cited as Radek Interview].
12. See infra notes 15-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of
prosecutorial discretion under RICO, the Hobbs Act, the Mail Fraud Act, and the
Travel Act.
13. The number of federal prosecutions of corrupt local officials increased
from 63 in 1970 to 337 in 1976. Ruff, supra note 2, at 1172 n.l. In 1979, 267 state and
local officials were indicted by the Public Integrity Section of the DOJ. STAFF OF
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY: CRIMINAL CODE REVISION ACT OF 1980, REPORT TO
ACCOMPANY H.R. 6915 302 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE
REPORT].
14. Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 1976
DUKE L.J. 651, 654 (1976).
statutory language nor the legislative history of the four statutes
applied to local corruption clearly authorizes such applications.
However, these statutes, enacted to deal with complex problems,
such as organized crime, have broad language amenable to "crea-
tive" interpretation. Federal courts have allowed federal prosecu-
tors to apply such general statutory language to conduct
apparently beyond the contemplation of the drafters of the
legislation.
A. Prosecutorial Discretion Under RICO
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) makes it a federal crime for a person, through a "pattern
of racketeering activity" to "conduct or participate, directly or in-
directly," in the affairs of an "enterprise" which is "engaged in" or
which "affects" interstate commerce.15 "Racketeering activity" is
broadly defined in 18 U.S.C. section 1961(1) and includes "any act
or threat involving ... robbery, bribery, [or] extortion ... which
is chargeable under state law and punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year."1 6 "Enterprise" is defined in general lan-
guage as "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associ-
ated in fact although not a legal entity."' 7
The legislative history of RICO "clearly indicates a congres-
sional intent that the statute be specifically aimed at combatting
the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime." 18 How-
ever, the structure of the statute facilitates its application to a
broad range of criminal conduct normally prosecuted at the state
level, including local corruption. The potentially broad applica-
tion of the statute is due in part to the jurisdictional elements of
the statute which are easily established.' 9 If the defendant has
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976). See Atkinson, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68: Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69
J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1-3 (1978) (describes, in detail, elements of
offense).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976).
18. Green, Coverage and Application of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970: The Anti-Racketeering Statute in Operation, 53 CHI. [-] KENT L. REV. 498, 499
(1976).
According to the Senate Judiciary Committee Report, RICO "has as its purpose
the elimination of the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legiti-
mate organizations operating in interstate commerce." STAFF OF SENATE JUDICI-
ARY COMM., 91ST CONG., 1ST SEss., REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF
1969 76 (Comm. Print 1969).
19. The jurisdictional requirement of RICO-that the enterprise must be en-
gaged in or its activities must affect interstate commerce-is satisfied without a
transactional link between the racketeering activity in a particular case and com-
merce. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 651 F.2d 239, 241-42 (4thCir. 1981); United
[Vol. 10: 321, 19831 Political Corruption
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committed more than one predicate act, thereby satisfying the
"pattern" requirement of section 1961(5), the statute is applicable
to the broad range of criminal activities incorporated in the defini-
tion of racketeering activity.
In the 1970's, federal prosecutors began to argue that RICO was
applicable to corrupt state and local government bodies.20 Under
this interpretation, a local official "on the take" would be partici-
pating in the conduct of the affairs of an "enterprise" - the gov-
ernment subdivision - through racketeering activity, i.e., bribery
or extortion under state law. This article will advance an argu-
ment that such an application of RICO is neither supported by its
States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 904 (1978) (brib-
ery of local police by participants in local vice activity); United States v. Cryan, 490
F. Supp. 1234, 1237 n.8 (D.N.J.), affid, 636 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1979), affid, 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072 (1980) (bribery of traffic court judge by warrant servers
to insuretheir jobs); United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976), ap-
peal dismissed, 550 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1977), affd in part, vacated and remanded
in part, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1977), affd en banc after retrial, 602 F.2d 1347 (4th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980) (bribery of governor in return for
favorable state regulation of an intrastate race track); United States v. Amato, 367
F. Supp. 547, 549-50 (D.N.Y. 1973) (transporting stolen securities and sale thereof).
These cases are all examples of RICO prosecutions with no significant transac-
tional interstate commerce link.
Under RICO, almost every conceivable local government subdivision has some
effect on interstate commerce. For example, in United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d
5 (4th Cir. 1980), the court found a sufficient nexus between a county prosecutor's
office and interstate commerce because interstate telephone calls were regularly
placed from the office and certain of the supplies used in the office had their ori-
gins outside the state. In United States v. Vignola, the Philadelphia Traffic Court
was found to affect interstate commerce because it had a special department to
process violations by cars registered out of state which had consulted with a New
Jersey computer firm. 464 F. Supp. at 1097 n.18.
20. Federal prosecutors forcefully advocated the inclusion of governmental
units in the term "enterprise" so they could take advantage of several features of
RICO in their attack on local corruption. Radek Interview, supra note 11; Inter-
view with Alan Rose, Assistant USA (hereinafter AUSA), in Boston, Mass. (Sept.
14, 1979). The Hobbs Act, the Mail Fraud Act, and the Travel Act require that the
particular conduct which is the basis for the prosecution be linked to interstate
commerce. Cf. RICO, which does not require a transactional link to interstate
commerce. See supra note 18. Because of RICO's definition of a "pattern" of rack-
eteering activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5), the statute can be used to prosecute criminal
acts occurring ten years before the most recent racketeering act. Prosecutors pro-
ceeding under the other statutes used to prosecute local corruption are con-
strained by a five-year statute of limitation. 18 U.S.C. § 3283 (1976). Prosecutors
can often bring in more incriminating evidence-e.g., of prior crimes-to prove
RICO's enterprise and pattern elements than would be admissible in prosecutions
under the other three statutes. Finally, the twenty year prison term under RICO,
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), is considerably higher than the criminal penalty of five years
found in the Travel Act and the Mail Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1952.
statutory language nor by its legislative history. Nonetheless, the
federal courts have interpreted "enterprise" to include police de-
partments, 21 state legislatures, 22 state and local executive agen-
cies, 2 3 municipal courts, 24 and local prosecutors' offices.25 It is
believed that the courts' permissive interpretation of RIC026 has
left federal prosecutors with too much discretion to develop and
execute federal law enforcement policy in the local corruption
context.
2 7
Courts which have interpreted "enterprise" to include local gov-
ernment units have stressed that the broad definition in section
1961(4)28 does not support any distinction between commercial
and public entities. 29 However, it should be noted that RICO was
drafted broadly only because Congress felt that it was necessary
to "adequately cover the wide range of activities covered by or-
ganized crime."30 Moreover:
'In divining legislative intent . . . a venerable precept of statutory con-
21. See United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Burnsed, 566 F.2d 882 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Ohlson, 552 F.2d 1347 (9th
Cir. 1977).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 651 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189
(E.D. Pa.), a.f'd, 571 F.2d 572 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 945 (1977).
23. See United States v. Dozier, 472 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 256 (1982); United States v. Barber, 668 F.2d 778 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
55 (1982); United States v. Dean, 647 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Fru-
mento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d. Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub. nom., Millhouse v. United
States, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978);
24. See United States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
25. See United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523 (4th Cir. 1980).
26. Only a single district court in the Fourth Circuit and a vigorous dissent in
a court of appeals decision from the Seventh Circuit have argued that "enterprise"
was not intended to include state and local government subdivisions. See United
States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1021 (D.C. Md. 1976). See also United States v.
Grywacz, 603 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J., dissenting).
27. Some commentators share the following opinion: The complex nature of
RICO's essential provisions, the broad statutory language of the Act, and
prosecutorial zeal in invoking RICO have unfortunately combined to result in the
application of the statute to situations for which it is not primarily intended ....
Government prosecutors have seized on RICO's expansive language and judicial
willingness to construe the statute in an unreasonably broad manner to distort
... the reach of the statute and extend its outermost limits. Comment, The Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act: An Analysis of the Confusion in
its Application and a Proposal for Reform, 33 VAND. L. REV. 441, 476-77 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as RICO Comment].
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4)(1976). See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
29. United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 685 (7th Cir. 1979).
30. Bradley, Racketeers, Congress and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65
IOWA L. REV. 837, 845 (1980).
Congress . . . felt that unless the predicate acts were defined broadly,
they would not adequately cover the wide range of activities covered by
organized crime. Still, the stated aim of RICO is to prevent the takeover
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struction, the doctrine of ejusdem generis, warns against expansively in-
terpretating broad language which immediately follows narrow and
specific terms. To the contrary, the maxim of statutory analysis counsels
courts to construe the broad in light of the narrow'.. . . None of the spe-
cific narrow nouns involved in [the] definition [of enterprise - individu-
als, partnership, corporation, association] are public entities. They are
rather a listing of the common legal forms in which business entities and
labor groups fashion themselves to carry out their private functions. The
more general references to "any legal entity". . . must be construed to be
limited to the same type and class of entities which preceded it in the
statutory definition.3 1
The legislative history of RICO does not support the argument
that Congress intended to include government bodies as enter-
prises. "Out of 2097 pages of hearings, two Congressional reports,
and Title IX itself, there are no explicit references to governmen-
tal units as 'enterprises' within Title IX."32 "Congress heard testi-
mony and reports of [organized crime] infiltration into a startling
variety of industries, unions, service organizations, and the like -
but nothing was said about governments." 33 "The more reason-
able interpretation is that Congress did not intend the term 'en-
terprise' to encompass government organizations."3 4
Those who argue that Congress intended "enterprises" to em-
brace state and local governments cite the Statement of Findings
and Purpose for the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.35 Con-
gress found that "the money and power" obtained by illegal vice
activities "are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legiti-
mate businesses and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our
democratic processes."36 "Organized crime activities in the U.S.
weaken the stability of the nation's economic system, ...
threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general wel-
or use of legitimate businesses by organized crime. There is no indication
RICO was designed ... to forbid infiltration of government agencies ....
Id. In addition, see statements of Senator McClellan, a prime sponsor of the RICO
statute in McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S.30) or its Critics: Which Threat-
ens Civil Liberties, 46 N.D.L. REV. 55, 142-44 (1970).
31. United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. at 1021 (quoting in part United States
v. Insco, 496 F.2d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1974)).
32. United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d at 690 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
33. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. at 1020.
34. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d at 690 (Swygert, J., dissenting). "[The] legislative his-
tory, completely silent on the classification of public entities as enterprises, is re-
plete with examples of legislators use of the word 'business' synonymously with
the statutory concept of 'enterprise.'" RICO Comment, supra note 27, at 474.
35. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970),
reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1073.
36. Id., 84 Stat. at 923, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1073.
fare of the nation and its citizens."37 The majority in one case ar-
gued that:
[this] legislative history manifests a serious concern by Congress not
merely with a profusion of racketeering activities within private busi-
nesses ...but with potentially devastating effects of organized crime on
the nation's political and economic system as a whole .... The logical in-
ference from these pronouncements is that Congress intended to frame a
widely encompassing enactment to protect both the public and private
sectors from the pervasive influences of racketeering. 3 8
It is obvious that Congress was concerned with protecting the
public sector from the influence of organized crime; section 1962
(c) of RICO explicitly sanctions attempts by participants in pri-
vate enterprises to corrupt government officials by bribery. How-
ever, it is not obvious that Congress also intended to protect the
public sector by punishing a government official conducting the
affairs of his office through a pattern of corrupt activity. Congres-
sional oversight of business enterprises conducted by illegal
means is clearly justified by its interstate commerce responsibili-
ties. Congressional oversight of corrupt state and local govern-
ment has a much weaker connection to interstate commerce and
represents a significant intrusion on local government auton-
omy.39 Therefore, it is reasonable to posit that Congress intended
to punish, under RICO, illegal activity connected with business
enterprises, but not with state and local government
"enterprises."
The Statement of Findings, cited to support an expansive inter-
pretation of "enterprise," refers to all eleven titles of the Organ-
ized Crime Control Act of 1970, but not specifically to Title IX,
which includes RICO. In light of the failure of the specific legisla-
tive history to discuss government "enterprises," this very general
language of the Statement provides little authority for the propo-
sition that "enterprise" was intended to include governments.40
Proponents of a broad interpretation of "enterprise" point out
that Congress specifically provided that "provisions of this title
shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose."41
37. Id.
38. United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d at 687 (citations omitted). The lower
court in United States v. Barber, 476 F. Supp. at 185-86, also cites some general
comments made during the opening congressional debates on the Organized
Crime Control Act to support the application of RICO to government enterprises.
The comments point out, with concern, that organized infiltration of the economy
often results in the corruption of local officials.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 79-82 for a discussion of federalism
concerns.
40. United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d at 690-91 (Swygert, J., dissenting);
United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. at 1022.
41. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat.
947 (1970).
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However, the court in United States v. Mandel properly argued
that RICO, "with its civil and criminal provisions has both puni-
tive and remedial purposes. While Congress may instruct courts
to give broad interpretation to civil provisions, it cannot require
courts to abandon the traditional canon of interpretation that am-
biguities in criminal statutes are to be construed in favor of leni-
ency .. *"42 The construction clause in RICO does not support
broadening the reach of RICO's criminal provision by including
government agencies as enterprises.
The remedies provided by Title IX include the criminal sanc-
tion of forfeiture of any interest in the "enterprise" 43 and the civil
sanctions of divestiture, restriction of activities, and dissolution or
reorganization of the "enterprise."44 As noted by the court in
Mandel, "[iut could hardly be contended that a private citizen of a
state, aggrieved by the 'racketeering acts' of an official in con-
ducting the [functions of a state or local government] could bring
a treble damage action against that official and require forfeiture
of office and dissolution of the state government." 45
"The primacy of the remedial provisions of Title IX46 and the
total inapplicability of the provisions to governmental entities cor-
roborate what the legislative history demonstrates: Congress had
no intention of including governmental units within the ambit of
the 'enterprise' provisions of Title IX."47
In sum, the RICO statute was apparently not intended by Con-
gress to apply to state and local government officials. Nonethe-
less, the federal courts have allowed federal officials to carry out
their policy of active prosecution of local corruption by applying
RICO. As a result, federal prosecutors have enjoyed a broad de-
42. United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. at 1022. See also United States v.
Grzywacz, 603 F.2d at 692 (Swygert, J., dissenting). United States v. Bass, 404 U.S.
336, 348-49 (1971), affirms the vitality of the doctrine of lenity and explores the
principles underlying it.
43. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976).
44. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976).
45. United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. at 1021. See also United States v.
Barber, 476 F. Supp. 182, 189 (S.D. W. Va. 1979) (removal of state official from of-
fice merely for violation of federal offense would be inconsistent with constitu-
tional notions of federalism).
46. Judge Swygert's dissent in Grzywacz sets out passages from the legisla-
tive history of RICO to document that these remedial provisions were considered
to be a crucial element in the statutory scheme to improve the effectiveness of fed-
eral criminal law in dealing with organized crime. See 603 F.2d at 691.
47. Id. (Swygert, J., dissenting).
gree of discretion to unilaterally determine the substantive reach
of federal criminal law.
B. Prosecutorial Discretion Under Other Statutes Used to
Prosecute Local Corruption
In the last decade, federal prosecutors have successfully prose-
cuted local corruption under the Hobbs Act, the Mail Fraud Act,
and the Travel Act.48 This section proposes that the recent appli-
cations of these three statutes to local corruption is inconsistent
with the intent of the drafters of the legislation. The federal
courts have too readily acquiesced in dubious prosecutorial inter-
pretations of these statutes, particularly the Hobbs Act.49 As a re-
sult, the discretion of prosecutors to formulate and execute law
enforcement policy in the local corruption context has not been
adequately limited.
1. The Hobbs Act
The Hobbs Act was passed in the 1950's to deal with the racke-
teering activities of organized labor.5 0 The Act punishes individu-
als who obstruct or "affect" interstate commerce by extortion or
robbery.5 1 Section 1951(b) (2) defines extortion as "the obtaining
of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful
use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color
of official right."52 Traditionally, to prove extortion, prosecutors
had to demonstrate that the defendant obtained property by "co-
ercion." As a result, the Hobbs Act was often inapplicable to offi-
cial corruption.5 3
In the late 1960's, however, federal prosecutors began to ad-
vance a novel interpretation of the Hobbs Act so as to overcome
48. See supra notes 6-9.
49. These three statutes, like RICO, prohibit an inclusive group of local of-
fenses when certain, easy-to-prove jurisdictional elements are present. This statu-
tory structure facilitates "creative" statutory interpretation by prosecutors.
50. See Ruff, supra note 2, at 1174-75.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(2) (1976). The Hobbs Act "was held not to be limited to
conduct that directly and immediately obstructs a particular movement of goods
in interstate commerce; criminal extortion or racketeering that produces only an
indirect effect on [commerce is] sufficient to sustain federal jurisdiction over the
offense." Brody, The Proposed Federal Criminal Code: An Unwarranted Expan-
sion in Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 39 OHIo ST. L.J. 132, 142 (1978).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (2) (1976).
53. The courts recognized the inducement of fear of economic loss as "coer-
cion." However, some decisions have held that such fear must relate to the loss of
an existing property interest. See, e.g., United States v. Kubacki, 237 F. Supp. 638,
640-42 (E.D. Pa. 1965). Therefore, in the common situation where a corrupt politi-
cian tacitly requires bribes from individuals who desire future economic benefits,
such as government contracts or employment, the extortion element of the Hobbs
Act was not satisfied. Ruff, supra note 2, at 1176-77.
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its limited applicability to local corruption. The prosecutors ar-
gued that the wrongful taking of money by a public official was il-
legal extortion "under color of official right," whether or not the
taking was accomplished by coercion or use of fear. It must be
remembered that the "color of right" language of section
1951(b) (2) had, to this point, been ignored by prosecutors and the
courts. 54
Additionally, as noted by several commentators, the application
of the statute to local corruption was not intended by the drafters.
For example, Charles Ruff points out that in the legislative his-
tory of the Hobbs Act there is no mention of the "color of right"
language or even of the problem of corrupt demands for pay-
ments by government officials. "If Congress had intended to
reach local corruption by creating a felony requiring no proof
either of intent to be influenced in one's official capacity or of in-
tent to obtain property by force or threats, surely the proponents
of the bill would have mentioned it."55
Despite the lack of clear legislative support, the courts acqui-
esced in the novel application of the "color of right" language. As
a result, "a statute thought only to be a mildly effective weapon
against labor racketeering became a major factor in the federal ef-
fort to combat local corruption."5 6
54. See discussion of the development of the Hobbs Act to reach local corrup-
tion in Henderson, supra note 2, at 386-93, and Ruff, supra note 2, at 1174-96.
55. See Ruff, supra note 2, at 1198-99. Ruff argues that, absent a clear expres-
sion of legislative intent, the courts should not expansively apply the Hobbs Act to
local corruption. Such an application would constitute a serious encroachment on
local government autonomy and would be contrary to the doctrine of strict con-
struction of criminal statutes.
In addition, see Comment, Prosecution Under the Hobbs Act and the Expansion
of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 66 J. CrIM. L AND CRIMINOLOGY 306, 318-19 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Hobbs Act Prosecution]. Cf Stem, Prosecution of Local
Political Corruption Under the Hobbs Act: The Unnecessary Distinction Between
Bribery and Extortion, 3 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 17 (1971), who argues that the lan-
guage of the Hobbs Act unambiguously adopts the common law offense of extor-
tion under color of right which does not require a showing of coercion.
Presumably, Stem would consider a resort to the legislative history of the Act im-
proper and unnecessary because the statutory language is plain on its face.
56. Henderson, supra note 2, at 392. Two recent Hobbs Act cases seemed to
limit the applicability of the Act to local political corruption. See United States v.
Culbert, 548 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 435 U.S. 371 (1978) (holding that con-
duct that did not constitute "racketeering" was not punishable under Hobbs Act
even though conduct seemed to be within literal reading of Act's language);
United States v. Yokley, 542 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1976). Neither court attempted to
define the term "racketeering" in general terms. Cf. United States v. Harding, 563
F.2d 299 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1977) (holding that extortion under
2. The Mail Fraud Act
The Mail Fraud Act punishes a person using the mails for "hav-
ing devised. . . any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, rep-
resentations or promises .... -57 Until recently, the statute had
been used primarily to reach "classic swindles" and securities
fraud schemes. 58 To establish the "fraud" element of the statute,
prosecutors traditionally were required to prove that the defend-
ant had developed a "scheme" with the intent to harm a victim.
This burden of proof made the statute ineffective against local
corruption. "Whereas mail fraud cases [typically involve] fraudu-
lently obtained goods or money, corruption cases [often] do not
involve a pecuniary loss to victims .... In [many] corruption
cases ... the defendants apparently do not intend to deprive the
victims of existing property rights, but simply to obtain a gain for
themselves." 59
In the early 1970's, federal prosecutors argued that the Mail
Fraud Act should be applied to a corrupt official because his un-
scrupulous conduct constituted a scheme to defraud the people of
his "faithful and loyal services." This novel interpretation, which
was accepted by the courts,60 has vastly expanded the applicabil-
ity of the Act to local corruption.6 1 However:
color of official right did constitute "racketeering" and was thus fully covered by
the Hobbs Act).
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held in United States v. Culbert,
435 U.S. 371 (1978), that the Hobbs Act applies to conduct within its literal terms
regardless of whether such conduct constitututes "racketeering," however defined.
After the Culbert decision, it seems unlikely that the Hobbs Act's applicability to
local corruption will be limited by a narrow construction of its terms.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
58. Henderson, supra note 2, at 393-94.
59. Comment, Survey of the Law of Mail Fraud, 1972 U. IL. L.F. 237, 245-47
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Mail Fraud].
United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974),
is an example of a corrupt scheme by a political official which resulted in no pecu-
niary harm to any victim. In Isaacs, the governor and Director of Revenue in Illi-
nois solicited and received an interest in two horse racing corporations in return
for initiating legislation favorable to the racing industry. They also influenced the
Illinois Racing Board to obtain valuable racing dates for these corporations. None
of the corporations' competitors lost any racing dates as a result of the defendant's
efforts and the state's revenues from racing greatly increased during the course of
the scheme. Mail Fraud, supra, at 247.
60. Mail Fraud, supra note 59, at 247.
61. Comment, Federal Prosecution of Elected State Officials for Mail Fraud:
Creative Prosecution or an Affront to Federalism 28 AM. U.L. REv. 63, 65-66 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Comment].
The Seventh Circuit has limited the applicability of the Mail Fraud Act to local
corruption. See, e.g., United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975) (the Act is inapplicable to local government officials
when use of mails is incidental to or does not further corrupt scheme). This
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[a]nalysis of the legislative history of [the Mail Fraud Act] . . . demon-
strates that the section's reach should be limited to fraudulent conduct
that results in the acquisition of money or property from the victim....
[U]se of [the statute] against politically corrupt politicians thus remains
contrary to Congress' original intent. Until Congress amends the section,
such use should not receive the imprimatur of the courts. 6 2
Thus, as with the Hobbs Act, the Mail Fraud Act has been ex-
panded through the use of a novel argument of federal prosecu-
tors, although such application is questionable with regard to
local government corruption.
3. The Travel Act
The Travel Act punishes the use of travel in interstate com-
merce or the use of facilities of interstate commerce to promote or
carry on "unlawful activity."63 The term "unlawful activity" incor-
porates extortion or bribery in violation of state law.64
Although the statutory language of this Act is admittedly broad
in scope, the legislative history is narrowly and specifically fo-
cused.65 The Supreme Court, in Rewis v. United States, 66 inter-
preted the legislative history as indicating that section "1952 was
aimed primarily at organized crime and, more specifically, at per-
sons who reside in one state while managing illegal activities lo-
cated in another."6 7 Once again, as with the Hobbs Act and Mail
Fraud Act, despite the absence of clear legislative support for the
application of the Travel Act to situations involving local corrup-
tion, the courts continue to freely apply it in such situations.68
seems to be a general trend in all mail fraud cases, e.g., United States v. Goss, 650
F.2d 1336 (5th Cir. 1981). Accord United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974).
62. Comment, The Intangible Rights Doctrine and Political-Corruption Prose-
cutions Under the Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 47 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 562, 587
(1980); see also Mail Fraud, supra note 59, at 239.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (1976).
64. See 128 U.S.C. § 1952(b) (1976).
65. Comment, The Travel Act: Its Limitation by the Seventh Circuit Within the
Context of Local Political Corruption, 52 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 503, 505-08 (1974);
Comment, The Continuing Debate Over Federal Criminal Jurisdiction Under the
Travel Ac 60 IowA L. REV. 1401, 1402-03 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Continuing
Debate ].
66. 401 U.S. 808 (1971).
67. Id. at 811.
68. E.g., United States v. LeFaivre, 507 F.2d 1288 (4th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Salsbury, 430 F.2d 1045 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Wechsler, 392 F.2d 344,
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 932 (1968).
The Second and Seventh Circuits have at least limited the discretion of federal
prosecutors applying the Travel Act to local corruption. Relying on dicta in United
States v. Rewis, 401 U.S. 808 (1971), these circuits have overturned convictions of
III. CONCERNS ABOUT BROAD FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION
A. Separation of Powers Concerns
As noted in the previous section, the federal courts have al-
lowed federal prosecutors to apply four statutes to local corrup-
tion in a manner which Congress did not intend. "The court's
reluctance to limit the expansion of these criminal statutes sug-
gest that. . . federal prosecutors hold virtually unlimited discre-
tion to define both the meaning of statutes as well as who they
should reach."69 The exercise of such lawmaking powers by pros-
ecutors appears incompatible with the constitutional notion of the
separation of powers. 70 The Supreme Court in United States v.
Bass71 stated that "because of the seriousness of criminal penal-
ties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the
moral condemnation of the community, legislatures . . . should
define criminal activity. This policy embodies 'the instinctive dis-
taste against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has
clearly said they should.' "72
Felix Franfurter wrote:
(Tjhe function in construing a statute is to ascertain the meaning of [the]
words used by the legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power which
our democracy has lodged in its elected legislature .... Whatever temp-
tations the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely suggest, con-
struction must eschew interpolation and evisceration. 7 3
It might be argued that Congress acquiesced in the application
corrupt officials when the use of interstate facilities were only "casually," "inci-
dentally" or "fortuitiously" linked to the corrupt conduct involved. See United
States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1149 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Archer, 468 F.2d
683 (2d Cir. 1973).
69. Hobbs Act Prosecution, supra note 55, at 322. See also United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971).
70. For the most part, the federal courts construing the criminal statutes appli-
cable to local political corruption have not explicitly considered issues of separa-
tion of powers. Courts which uphold broad interpretations of these statutes argue
that such interpretations are consistent with the broad statutory language. See
supra text accompanying notes 29 & 30. Other courts advocate a narrow interpre-
tation because the focused legislative histories of these statutes suggest that Con-
gress never intended that they be applied to local corruption; these courts often
cite the doctrines of comity and lenity to support a narrow interpretation of gen-
eral statutory language. A litigator attacking an expansive interpretation of one of
these four statutes should probably argue along the lines suggested in the preced-
ing sentences without explicitly invoking notions of separation of powers. How-
ever, separation of power notions are implicit in any invocation of the doctrine of
lenity. The Supreme Court in Bass recognized that separation of power notions
underlie the doctrine of lenity. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
71. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
72. Id. at 349. This statement was offered as one of the two reasons why ambi-
guities in criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of leniency.
73. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527, 533 (1947).
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of these four statutes to local corruption by failing to amend them
in the face of expansive prosecutorial interpretations which were
validated by the courts. However, the acquiescence argument
makes the dubious assumption that Congress is continually moni-
toring the judicial interpretations of its criminal statutes.74 More-
over, the congressional amendment process is cumbersome and
subject to the vagaries of politics.7 5 For these reasons, the failure
of Congress to amend a criminal statute in the face of a dubious
judicial interpretation does not indicate that Congress supports
the interpretation. In any event, implicit congressional approval
of how federal prosecutors exercise de facto lawmaking powers
will not eliminate separation of power concerns.
The four federal statutes used to prosecute local corruption
criminalize very general categories of predicate acts when com-
mon jurisdictional elements are present. Some legal scholars
have found such statutory language to contain implicit delegation
of lawmaking authority to federal prosecutors. 76 However, even if
Congress had explicitly delegated to federal prosecutors the
74. See Hobbs Acts Prosecution, supra note 55, at 320. "[Moreover,] such mon-
itoring is not done in a public manner; therefore citizens cannot know what is
criminal since the statutes change meaning by gradual accretions which are not
reflected in the legislative histories or statutory language." Id.
75. 1 N. ABRAMS, CONSULTANT'S REPORT ON JURISDICTION IN WORKING PAPERS
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 33, 60
(1970) [hereinafter cited as ABRAMS].
76. For example, Chief Justice Burger has argued that "when a 'new' fraud de-
velops-as constantly happens-the mail fraud statute becomes a stopgap device
to deal on a temporary basis with the new phenomenon until particularized legis-
lation can be ... passed to deal directly with the evil." United States v. Maze, 414
U.S. 395, 405-06 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
One commentator discussing the Hobbs Act stated that "[C]ongress has ...
draft[ed] the statute broadly[,] . . .leaving to the executive broad flexibility and
discretion in deciding which violations to prosecute.... Congress apparently
wishes to make the jurisdiciton available for use in an unusual or extraordinary
case." Pauley, An Analysis of Some Aspects of Jurisdiction Under S. 1437, The Pro-
posed Federal Criminal Code, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 475, 488-89 (1979).
Section II of this article indicates that the legislative histories of the four stat-
utes used to prosecute local corruption were narrowly focused on specific
problems other than corruption. The legislative histories negate a congressional
intent to broadly delegate to federal prosecutors the discretionary power to apply
these statutes in entirely different factual contexts. When the legislative intent is
ambiguous, the courts generally construe statues to avoid possible constitutional
infirmities. See, e.g., discussion of the doctrine of comity, infra, text Section
HI(B) (1). Given the ambiguity of the legislative intent, the language of these stat-
utes should not be interpreted as broadly delegating law making powers because
such delegation may be objectionable on separation of power grounds. See infra
note 78 and accompanying text.
power to create new federal felonies, such broad delegation would
be objectionable because of separation of power concerns. 77
Broad delegations of power are objectionable because they permit respon-
sibility for government to pass out of the hands of Congress. To a certain
degree therefore, broad delegation undermines the electoral check on
Congressional power .... Moreover ... broad delegations are politically
objectionable because, by enabling Congress to pass the buck on hard
choices, and to leave such choices to administrative or executive
processes less open to inputs from affected groups, such delegations may
short-circuit the pluralist processes of interest accomodation usually
structuring legislative decision making.7 8
B. Federalism Concerns
Federal prosecutors enjoy broad discretion to prosecute local
corruption - conduct which was policed almost exclusively at the
state level until a decade ago. This broad discretion may result in
77. When the validity of a congressional delegation of its lawmaking powers is
at issue, the courts focus directly at issues of separation of powers. 1 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 157 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as DAviS]. A lit-
igator attacking an excessive delegation of legislative power to define crimes
would stress separation of powers issues. Cf., N. ABRAMS, supra note 75.
78. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrTIONAL LAw 288 (1978). In the administrative
law context, explicit delegations of criminal lawmaking authority to administrative
agencies is sometimes upheld over separation of power objections. See DAVIS,
supra note 77, at 150-51. "Since 1911, federal law has been clear that administra-
tors may be delegated power to issue regulations the violation of which a statute
makes a crime. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911)." DAVIS, supra note
77, at 190.
The Grimaud doctrine does not significantly weaken the separation of powers
objections to congressional delegation of power to federal prosecutors to define
new federal felonies. The courts are reluctant to uphold broad delegations of law-
making power when Congress is, itself, capable of developing more definitive crim-
inal law provisions. W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: CASES AND
COMMENTS 71 (6th ed. 1974). Congressional delegations to administrative agencies
occur most often in complex, technical areas in which only a specialized adminis-
trative agency is practically equipped to develop rational guidelines. For example,
the Clean Air Act of 1970"authorizes the Administrator of the E.P.A. to set "emis-
sion standards" for hazardous air pollutants, the knowing violation of which is a
criminal offense under § 113(c) (1) (C) of the Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857(c),
1858(c) (1) (c) (1976). See also Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275,
276-77 (1978). Grimaud involved a statute which provided for criminal sanctions
for violations of the Secretary of Agriculture's rules about using forest reserva-
tions. By contrast, Congress is qualified to consider the broad social, moral, eco-
nomic, and political issues relevant to the development of widely applicable
standards of social conduct.
The sanctions for regulatory crimes are generally minor compared to sanctions
for federal felonies. Conduct that involves severe criminal penalties should be de-
fined by a highly visible and democratic institution, namely, Congress. Finally, ad-
ministrative agencies which promulgate regulations which will trigger criminal
sanctions do so under a significant system of procedural safeguards that provide
for public scrutiny and feedback-the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C.
§ 551 (1976). Prosecutorial discretion to define new crimes by broadly interpreting
federal statutes is invisible from the public and uncontrolled by formal procedural
restrictions, which makes broad delegation of lawmaking powers all the more
objectionable.
[Vol. 10: 321, 1983] Political Corruption
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
a radical alteration of the balance of law enforcement responsibil-
ity between the states and the federal government, contrary to
constitutional notions of federalism.
There are numerous concerns about the federal government's
expanding role in policing local criminal activity. Because of the
remoteness of Congress from the local electorate, federal criminal
law will be relatively unresponsive to changing social concerns.
Centralized law enforcement authority, insulated from local con-
trol, may become oppressive.7 9 Most importantly, the unre-
strained exercise of federal criminal jurisdiction would work "a
wholesale destruction of state responsibility and state autonomy
in the preservation of public order and the administration of crim-
inal law."80
The state interest in law enforcement autonomy seems espe-
cially compelling in the context of local political corruption.
The duty owed the state and its citizens by an elected official is fiduciary
in nature, a special duty of honest and faithful service. Insuring the per-
formance of this duty is best left to its beneficiaries - the people and gov-
ernment of the state. Indiscriminate intervention by the federal
government may dampen not only internal state efforts at reforms, but
also the special rapport necessary between an elected representative and
his constituency.
81
79. Continuing Debate, supra note 65, at 1415-19.
80. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law and Procedures of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971) (resolution by Na-
tional Association of Attorneys General-Disapproval of Study Draft of Proposed
New Federal Criminal Code) [hereinafter cited as Subcomm. Hearings].
The destruction of state autonomy in local law enforcement directly raises seri-
ous federalism problems. Moreover, the assumption of greater state and local law
enforcement responsibility by the federal government would also add to the bur-
dens of the vastly overburdened federal judiciary. Hufstedler, Comity and the
Constitution: The Changing Role of the Federal Judiciary, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 841,
857-58 (1972). The effect, at least in the short run, will be a reduction in the effec-
tiveness of criminal law enforcement.
81. See Comment, supra note 61, at 73-74. Some have argued that federalism
concerns about the increasing assumption of local law enforcement responsibility
by the federal government are undercut by the willingness of state and local offi-
cials to accept more and more federal intervention. Comment, The Scope of Fed-
eral Criminal Jurisdiction Under the Commerce Clause, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 805, 822-23
(1972); Interview with Philip Heymann, Assistant Attorney General and Chief of
the Criminal Division, Department of Justice, in Cambridge, Mass. (Oct. 29, 1979)
(seminar Discussion) [hereinafter cited as Heymann Interview]. However, the
testimony of state Attorneys General at the hearings on the proposed federal
criminal code suggests that the states are not happy with the growing federal role
in policing local crime, especially local corruption: The Attorneys General
strongly criticized the expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction under the pro-
posed code and recommended that enforcement of local corruption should be left
entirely to the states. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 80; see also STAFF OF SEN-
"The primary responsibility for feretting out ... the political cor-
ruption of [local officals] must rest, until Congress directs other-
wise, with the state, the political unit most directly involved." 82
Concerns about significant changes in the allocation of law en-
forcement responsibility between the states and the federal gov-
ernment are embodied in two doctrines: the doctrine of comity
and the doctrine that the federal government should not exercise
criminal jurisdiction absent a strong federal interest. The broad
federal discretion to prosecute local corruption, discussed in Sec-
tion II, is in conflict with both doctrines.
1. Comity
The Supreme Court in United States v. Bass83 described the
principle of comity as follows: "Unless Congress conveys its pur-
pose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed
the federal-state balance. . . . We will not be quick to assume
that Congress has meant to effect a significant change in the sen-
sitive relations between federal and state criminal jurisdiction." 84
The doctrine, the Court continued, is based on Congress' tradi-
tional reluctance "to define as a federal crime conduct readily de-
nounced as criminal by the states" and is "rooted in the ...
concepts of American federalism."85 The legislative histories of
RICO and the other statutes applied to local corruption do not in-
dicate a clear congressional intent to reach such conduct. Addi-
tionally, given the ambiguity of the legislative intent, the
discretion of federal prosecutors to broadly interpret the statutory
language to reach conduct traditionally policed by the states
seems inconsistent with the doctrine of comity.
2. Substantial Federal Interest
The second doctrine rooted in federalism seeks to limit the ex-
ercise of an unambiguous legislative grant of federal criminal ju-
risdiction. "The federal prosecutor should recognize that the
existence of jurisdiction is not a mandate to federalize all forms of
state crime but is, rather, intended to be auxilliary to state en-
ATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., IST SEss., REPORT TO ACCOMPANY S. 1,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1975 (1975) (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter
cited as COMM. PRINT]; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law and Proce-
dures of Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 927-39, 944-52, 1023-29, 1166-
79 (1972) (statements of various state Attorneys General).
82. United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 778-79 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 425 U.S.
973 (1976).
83. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
84. Id. at 349. See also Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971).
85. 404 U.S. at 349.
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forcement." 86 The presence of a particular jurisdictional element
under a federal criminal statute "only very crudely marks off an
area in which . . a substantial national interest exists. '87 "While
sections of the Constitution can be stretched to justify federal
control over nearly every phase of human conduct, the spirit of
the document still demands that there be true need for federal ac-
tion - a true federal interest - before the federal government
may act."88
Assuming that Congress had clearly granted federal jurisdic-
tion over local corruption, there are admittedly instances in which
a substantial federal interest in the exercise of that jurisdiction
does exist.8 9 However, federal discretion under RICO and the
other federal statutes is so broad that prosecutions which fail to
serve a substantial federal interest can and do result.
If state and local corruption causes the breakdown of local law
enforcement, the case for federal intervention is strong.9 0 Corrup-
tion in enforcement of state laws often encourages offenses that
are also federal crimes. "Also, to the extent that corruption dis-
courages the exchange of information and other forms of coopera-
tion between federal agencies and local [enforcement officials], it
will have still broader ramifications for the effectiveness of federal
law enforcement .. -91 A great number of reported RICO cases
involve prosecutions of local police officials 92 or prosecutors 93 who
have accepted bribes to "protect" local vice activity. It is debata-
ble whether there is a strong federal interest in combating cor-
rupt non-enforcement of state law against, for example, purely
86. Ruff, supra note 2, at 1213-14.
87. Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutorial Discretion, 13
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 64, 79 (1948).
88. Dobbyn, A Proposal for Changing the Jurisdictional Provisions of the New
Federal Criminal Code, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 198, 201 (1972).
89. Any conclusion stated in this section that federal prosecution seems justi-
fied is based on the assumption that Congress evinced a clear intention to reach
local political corruption. It is argued above that it is doubtful that Congress ever
intended that RICO and the other three stautes be applied to local corruption.
Under the doctrine of comity, the statutes should not be so applied.
90. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, FINAL RE-
PORT: PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE SECTION 207 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as BROWN COMM'N PROPOSAL].
91. Ruff, supra note 2, at 1217.
92. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 21.
93. See, e.g., United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5 (4th Cir. 1980).
local gambling and prostitution.94 However, in many cases, fed-
eral prosecution of corrupt local law enforcement officials seems
justified.
Federal prosecutions of corrupt local officals who are not in-
volved in law enforcement are often justified by the argument
that local enforcement officials are unwilling to prosecute such
defendants themselves.95 When local officials request federal in-
tervention or when there is evidence of systematic or improper
failure to prosecute at the local level, federal intervention is, as
noted above, perhaps justified. However, "an inquiry into the
willingness . . . of state prosecutors to attack local political cor-
ruption is often, in reality, an examination of the [state] prosecu-
tor's discretion. . . . Federal prosecutors . . . [should not]
override state discretion on an unsupported assumption that the
state prosecutor will not do his job."96 For example, United States
v. Fineman97 involved a RICO prosecution of the Speaker of the
Pennsylvania House of Representatives, who allegedly wrote let-
ters of recommendation to state medical schools in return for in-
direct bribes from in-state applicants. Federal prosecutors
brought the case even though it was under investigation by a spe-
cial state prosecutor, who had apparently decided not to indict.
The federal jury found the evidence, which was based on the self-
serving testimony of an informant, inadequate to support the
RICO counts in a multi-count indictment.98 However, the RICO
indictment in Fineman may have been improperly based on an
unsupported assumption that state enforcement officials declined
prosecution for reasons constituting an abuse of discretion.
Federal prosecution of local offenses such as political corrup-
tion is justified in cases where local enforcement officials are inca-
pable of successfully prosecuting serious offenses. For example,
federal intervention may be necessary to police complex multi-
state criminal ventures that involve corruption of state and local
government units. It is inefficient and impractical for local au-
thorities to investigate multistate crime because they are limited
to prosecution of the local aspects of the criminal activity. More-
over, the states lack the legal mechanisms possessed by federal
officials to bring scattered defendants to a single trial and compel
94. See Ruff, supra note 2, at 1217-18; see also United States v. Burnsed, 566
F.2d 882 (4th Cir. 1977).
95. ABRAMs, supra note 75, at 54. "Federal investigation and prosecution may
be desirable because local law enforcement may find it difficult or awkward to pro-
ceed since local officials are involved." Id.
96. Comment, supra note 61, at 74.
97. 434 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 571 F.2d 572 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 945 (1977).
98. Fineman was convicted only on a related obstruction of justice charge. Id.
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the appearance of distant witnesses. Finally, it seems inequitable
to saddle one jurisdiction with the entire cost of investigation and
prosecution of criminal conduct that transcends that
jurisdiction.99
Federal exercise of criminal jurisdiction in political corruption
cases may also be appropriate when organized crime is involved,
since the adverse social consequenses of allowing such activity to
escape enforcement are substantialoo "Corruption of public offi-
cials is one of the standard techniques of organized crime."'10 1 A
study by the Senate indicated that attorneys general in many
states lack the authority to prosecute, successfully, complex or-
ganized crime acitvities.102
Efficient prosecution of local corruption frequently requires the
use of highly specialized investigatory techniques' 0 3 which the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and United States Attorneys
(USA's) are better equipped to employ. 04 "Federal agents begin
to handle some types of crimes just because they do the job bet-
ter and local police begin to defer and abdicate their function for
this same reason."' 05 However, "if efficiency were the sole crite-
rion for federal participation, many traditional state functions
might be usurped by a more efficient federal bureaucracy ...
Federalism, rather than efficient administration, is the issue."1 06
Given a "state's special interest in policing its own political pro-
cess,"' 0 7 a federal interest greater than relative efficiency seems
necessary to justify federal intervention. "Administrative dis-
economies can be rectified by federal-state cooperation during the
course of the investigation" and/or federal aid to local
enforcement. 08
Prosecution may serve a substantial federal interest when the
99. See ABRAMS, supra note 75, at 52-53.
100. See BROWN COMM'N PROPOSAL, supra note 90, at 17.
101. W. SEYMOUR, UNITED STATES ATrORNEY: AN INSIDE VIEW OF 'JUSTICE' IN
AMERICA UNDER THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION 170 (1975).
102. See Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 80, at 943.
103. For example, skilled analysis of government agency records by profes-
sional auditors to uncover patterns of illegal diversions of agency funds may be
required.
104. See generally Radek Interview, supra note 11; Boston Evening Globe,
supra note 2.
105. ABRAMS, supra note 75, at 53.
106. Comment, supra note 61, at 77.
107. Id.
108. Id.
applicable state or local charges are less serious than the applica-
ble federal charges.109 If the federal offense covering particular
conduct is more grave than the relevant state offense, local prose-
cution will not vindicate those federal interests that Congress
contemplated in enacting the provision.
A sufficient federal interest in intervention may also exist
where the jurisdictional base is closely related to the offense in-
volved.110 For example, an offense which substantially threatens
the integrity of the United States mails or imposes a direct bur-
den on interstate commerce would seem appropriate for federal
prosecution."' A substantial federal interest in the prosecution
of local political corruption may also arise from resulting interfer-
ence with federal programs or the improper use of federal
funds.112
There are many examples, however, of federal prosecutions
lacking any of the federal interests discussed above. The increas-
ing occurrence of federal prosecutions of local corruption, when
there is no substantial federal interest, indicates that
prosecutorial discretion is too broad and that its exercise is incon-
sistent with constitutional notions of federalism.
There are many examples of RICO prosecutions of local corrup-
tion where a significant federal interest was not demonstrated.
For example, in United States v. Vignola, 113 the President Judge
of the Philadelphia Traffic Court was convicted for collecting
bribes from employees to guarantee their continued tenure and to
"fix" traffic tickets. No transactional link to interstate commerce
was apparent, and there was no indication that state enforcement
officials were unable or unwilling to deal with such isolated cor-
109. In determining whether a federal statute is "applicable" to a state law of-
fense, it is important to establish whether Congress clearly intended the statute to
apply to that type of conduct. Congress did not intend for the RICO statute to be
applied to local officials who accept bribes to influence their official actions. See
text Section II(A). Therefore, a substantial federal interest would not be served
by a RICO prosecution of a corrupt official for accepting bribes even though the
RICO offense is much more grave than the applicable state law offense. See infra
note 119.
110. See Schwartz, supra note 87.
111. See Comment, supra note 61, at 75-76. Several recent RICO prosecutions
seem justifiable because the official conduct involved had a substantial impact on
interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir.
1977). In Frumento, the defendants were employees of a state liquor and cigarette
tax commission. They smuggled liquor into the state and resold it after attaching
phony state tax stamps so as to avoid incurring state liquor taxes. The scheme
directly involved interstate smuggling, and prosecution seemed to serve the fed-
eral interest in protecting interstate commerce. See also United States v. Barber,
668 F.2d 778 (1982).
112. See Ruff, supra note 2, at 1215.
113. 464 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 605 F.2d 1199 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1072 (1980).
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ruption in a minor part of the city judicial system. The justifica-
tion for federal prosecution was unclear at best.
In United States v. Salvitti, 14 the Executive Director of the
Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority was prosecuted under
RICO for taking an indirect kickback in return for a favorable set-
tlement with an individual who had a disputed claim to a local
parcel controlled by the Authority. No transactional link to inter-
state commerce was involved, and there was no evidence of cor-
ruption or politically motivated enforcement inertia. In fact, the
Mayor's office publicly repudiated the settlement negotiated by
the defendant. A federal interest, if any, seems remote at best.
Studies of federal statutes in addition to RICO also indicate
that the courts are allowing federal prosecution of local corrup-
tion despite the absence of a significant federal interest. One
study of the Mail Fraud Act concluded that "the vast majority of
federal mail fraud prosecutions of elected state officials have been
conducted with insufficient consideration as to either the special
interest of a state in policing its own political processes or the
existence of a special federal interest to justify such prosecu-
tions."" 5 An analysis of the Hobbs Act found that "it is apparent
... from the present Hobbs Act prosecutions that many of [the
crimes prosecuted] had only remote and tangential effects upon
the national policy. 1" 6 Prosecutions in these instances fail to
serve a substantial federal interest.
C. Concerns About the Fairness of the Criminal Justice System
For many years there has been concern about the role of discretion in
criminal administration-the extent to which the subjective judgment of
an official determines what will be done with a suspect, defendant or con-
vict. The basis for this concern has been the fear that people's lives, lib-
erty and well-being depend on arbitrary, discriminatory or corrupt
decisions.11
7
This section will assess the impact of the broad discretion of fed-
eral prosecutors to prosecute local corruption on the fairness of
the criminal justice process.
Broad federal discretion in prosecuting local corruption may re-
sult in horizontal inequity-dissimilar treatment of similar offend-
ers. A local official who has solicited a bribe faces state bribery
114. 451 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 588 F.2d 822 (3rd Cir. 1978).
115. Comment, supra note 61, at 77.
116. Hobbs Act Prosecution, supra note 55, at 323.
117. Vorenberg, supra note 14, at 652.
sanctions as well as federal law sanctions if one of the common
federal jurisdictional elements is present. Because federal of-
fenses have distinct jurisdictional elements, the courts have
found that double state/federal prosecutions do not violate the
double jeopardy clause." 8 The penalties under state and federal
law for identical political offenses are substantially different." 9
Since several of the jurisdictional elements of the four statutes
used to prosecute local corruption are commonly present, federal
prosecutors frequently enjoy the discretion to indict corrupt gov-
ernment officials under more than one federal statute.120 The dis-
cretion of the prosecutor to charge under more than one of these
statutes gives him significant control over the possible penalty im-
posed on a defendant since the penalties range from five to
twenty years' imprisonment and from $1000 to $25,000 in fines.' 2'
Clearly, the federal prosecutor, because of his power to prose-
cute under one or more of several federal statutes or to defer to
state prosecution, has enormous discretion to treat identical of-
fenders differently. "There is no clear statutory evidence to prove
substantial inter- or intra-district disparity in the procedures of
federal prosecutors. The lack of proof belies only the primitive
state of methodology and does not demonstrate that [this enor-
mous prosecutorial discretion does not require close control.]"122
The discretion of federal prosecutors to punish conduct not
clearly covered by federal statutes makes the criminal justice sys-
tem less fair by denying offenders clear advance notice of what
118. Double prosecutions are upheld even when the defendant has been acquit-
ted in state court for an offense that constituted the predicate act in a subsequent
federal prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir.
1977).
119. For example, the maximum penalty for state common law bribery is typi-
cally one year of imprisonment. See Ruff, supra note 2, at 1196. A local official can
be prosecuted under the Hobbs Act or RICO and face imprisonment for up to
twenty years for the solicitation of a bribe, regardless of the amount involved. At-
kinson, supra note 15, at 2, 18.
120. In United States v. Gillock, 587 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 360
(1980), a Tennessee state senator was indicted under the Hobbs Act, the Travel
Act, and RICO. The case reached the U.S. Supreme Court on a legislative privi-
lege issue; the Court did not reach any substantive RICO issue.
In United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976), the Governor of
Maryland was indicted under both the Mail Fraud Act and RICO for the same cor-
rupt transaction.
121. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a), 1341, 1951, 1952 (1976). The discretion of the prosecu-
tor to determine the punishment for an offense by selecting the charges is, of
course, limited by the judicial determination of a sentence. An analysis of the im-
pact of the prosecutor's charging decision on the sentence actually imposed is be-
yond the scope of this article. For a discussion of this subject, see Bubany &
Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An Administrative Law for Prosecutorial Decision
Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 473, 480-81 (1976).
122. Beck, The Administrative Law of Criminal Prosecution: The Development
of Prosecution Policy, 27 AM. U. L. REv. 310, 343 (1978).
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conduct is punishable under federal law.123 Some scholars argue
that this notice argument is substantially weakened because the
predicate acts under statutes like the Hobbs Act and RICO are
clearly criminal at the state level.' 24 However, given that federal
law penalites are often substantially greater than state law penal-
ties, notice of possible incremental punishment under federal law
seems required on fairness grounds.
Broad official discretion can also make the criminal justice sys-
tem less fair by facilitating the exercise of official discretion for
improper reasons. While corruption among federal prosecutors is
not a significant problem, the political nature of the office of the
USA may promote the unfair exercise of prosecutorial charging
discretion. Excessively vigorous prosecution of local corruption
may be politically expedient for a prosecutor who covets a higher
political office.125
IV. NARROWING FEDERAL DISCRETION IN THE PROSECUTION OF
LOCAL PoLIICAL CORRUPTION
Section III discussed several concerns about broad federal dis-
cretion in the prosecution of local political corruption. This Sec-
tion will examine alternative ways of narrowing that discretion
through judicial, legislative, and administrative action and evalu-
ates recent efforts by Congress and the Justice Department to
limit prosecutorial discretion in this area.
A. Judicial Action to Narrow Federal Prosecutorial Discretion
1. Judical Interpretation of Federal Criminal Statutes
Federal prosecutors have carried out their policy of vigorous
123. Vorenberg, supra note 14, at 665. Notions of "fair notice" underlie the prac-
tice of voiding ambiguous criminal statutes for vagueness under the due process
clause. See LEFAVE & SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 83-89 (1972). The courts
have uniformly rejected constitutional challenges to RICO and the other statutes
on constitutional vagueness grounds.See, e.g., United States v. White, 386 F. Supp.
882 (E.D. Wis. 1974); United States v. Stofshky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
The notice argument made here is a policy argument that has significance in-
dependent of the constitutional doctrine. As the Supreme Court has stated: "A
fair warning should be given to the world in the language that the common world
will understand, of what law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the
warning fair, so [far] as possible the line should be clear." United States v. Bass,
404 U.S. at 348. The Court stated that this notion of fair warning is at the base of
the doctrine of lenity.
124. Heymann Interview, supra note 81.
125. Comment, supra note 61, at 78-79.
prosecution of local corruption by successfully advocating "crea-
tive" interpretations of four federal statutes. Narrower judicial in-
terpretations of these statutes would be consistent with the
apparent legislative intent and the principles of comity, separa-
tion of powers, and federalism. If the courts were less inclined to
validate broad interpretations of such statutes, prosecutorial dis-
cretion to develop and implement broad law enforcement policy
in the local corruption area could be greatly narrowed. Such a ju-
dicial policy may impair the ability of federal officials to prosecute
some offenses which are not being effectively policed at the state
level. However, "[whileI the temptation to extend the legislation
is great in cases where evil men otherwise would go free. . . both
the judges and the prosecutors have a responsibility to put aside
private attitudes and avoid rewriting legislation."' 2 6
It should be noted that the reach of the Mail Fraud and Travel
Acts to local corruption has been narrowed in some jurisdic-
tions.127 However, recent federal courts continue to accept expan-
sive interpretations of the RICO statute and the Hobbs Act in
local corruption prosecutions. Overall, then, there is little hope
that federal prosecutorial discretion in this area will be signifi-
cantly narrowed by future changes in federal court interpreta-
tions of the relevant statutes.
2. Limited Judicial Review
Kenneth Culp Davis advocates limited judicial review of the
prosecutor's charging discretion, similar in scope to review of de-
cisions of administrative agencies. He argues that review limited
to remedying abuses of prosecutorial discretion would not result
in the courts "taking over" basic prosecutorial functions.128
The federal courts have held that even limited judicial review of
prosecutorial discretion is unconstitutional 29 or at least unwise.
The Second Circuit, in 1973, stated:
[TJhe manifold imponderables which enter into the prosecutor's decision
to prosecute or not to prosecute make the choice not readily amenable to
judicial supervision. 13 0 . .. On balance, we believe that substitution of a
126. Hobbs Act Prosecution, supra note 55, at 322.
127. See generally Comment, supra note 61.
128. K. DAvIs, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 211 (1969).
129. Traditionally, federal courts have argued that judicial review of
prosecutorial discretion violates the principle of separation of powers. See, e.g.,
United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Cox v. Hauberg,
381 U.S. 95 (1965). But, as Davis properly points out, the courts constantly allow
limited judicial review of delegated executive discretion in the adminstrative law
area. DAVIS, supra note 128 at 209-12. The discussion in the text will focus on the
wisdom of limited judicial review of prosecutorial discretion, not its
constitutionality.
130. The Second Circuit continued:
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court's decision to compel prosecution for the U.S. Attorney's decision not
to prosecute, even upon an abuse of discretion standard of review and
even if limited to directing that a prosecution be undertaken in good faith
• ..would be unwise.
1 3 1
Increasing reliance on judicial review to control prosecutorial
charging discretion would raise several serious problems. Judi-
cial review of the prosecutor's charging decision may "judicialize"
this level of decision-making by causing it to be more formal and
trial-like. "As a trend toward judicialization grows, the criminal
process as a whole becomes enormously more complex, expen-
sive and time consuming."132 Moreover, "ready availability of ju-
dicial review could interfere with the rapid development of the
desired types of internal controls."133 As Professor Vorenberg has
pointed out, "It]he process of narrowing discretion will be pro-
moted if courts, in protecting the individuals against abuse, find
ways to encourage rather than preempt the assumption of respon-
sibility by legislatures and criminal justice officials."' 34 Finally,
administrative review, limited to a judicial determination of
whether an official has abused his discretion, may not be ade-
quate to deal with the problems of prosecutorial charging discre-
tion, as noted in the following passage:
Judicial review is best adapted to correcting real, particularly extreme,
In the absence of statutorily defined standards governing reviewability, or
regulatory or statutory policies of prosecution, the problems inherent in
the task of supervising prosecutorial decisions do not lend themselves to
resolution by the judiciary .... [It is not] clear what the judiciary's role
of supervision should be were it to undertake such a review. At what
point would the prosecutor be entitled to call a halt to further investiga-
tion as unlikely to be productive? . .. What collateral factors would be
permissible basis for a decision not to prosecute, e.g., the pendency of an-
other criminal proceeding elsewhere against the same parties? What sort
of review should be available in cases like the present one where the con-
duct complained of allegedly violates state as well as federal law? ...
These difficult questions engender serious doubts as to the judiciary's ca-
pacity to review and as to the problem of arbitrariness inherent in judicial
decision to order prosecution.
Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380-81 (2d Cir.
1973) (citations omitted). See also Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480
(D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J.).
131. Inmates of Attica, 477 F.2d at 380-81. The courts do review prosecutorial
charging discretion if it is exercised on the basis of a constitutionally forbidden
factor such as race. See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
132. Cox, Prosecutorial Discretion: An Overview, 13 AM. CRmI. L. REV. 383, 385-
86 (1976).
133. Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion,
19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 51-52. See infra text accompanying notes 264-70 for a discus-
sion of DOJ Guidelines.
134. Vorenberg, supra note 14, at 697.
abuses in administrative action.... Although such abuses may occur,
real arbitrarity is not necessarily the major problem of prosecutorial deci-
sion-making today. The unevenness of application inherent in a multiple
decision-maker system operating without articulated criteria is also of
great concern. And judicial review is not well adapted to correcting such
unevenness.
1 3 5
In light of these problems and judicial reluctance to review
prosecutorial discretion, expanding judicial review does not seem
a very promising alternative for control of federal prosecutorial
discretion.136
B. Legislative Action to Narrow Federal Prosecutorial
Discretion
1. Legislative Pronouncements on Major Policy Issues
Neither the statutory language nor the legislative histories of
the four federal statutes used to prosecute political corruption in-
dicate that Congress intended to sanction such conduct. The con-
stitutional concept of separation of powers requires that Congress
definitively answer broad substantive questions such as whether
local corruption is to be a federal offense. 137 Morevover, as a mat-
ter of policy, "legislatures should take responsibility for major is-
sues of policy which they believe are ripe for the relatively long-
term resolution involved in legislation."138
The most recent versions of the proposed criminal code in both
the House139 and the Senate' 40 explicitly criminalize local corrup-
tion to roughly the same extent as does the current case law.
Both proposed codes have provisions, similar to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c) of RICO, 141 which expressly include government bodies
as "enterprises."'142 The Judiciary Committee Reports of both
135. Abrams, supra note 133, at 51-52.
136. Other aspects of judicial review are discussed in text infra at Section
IV(C) (6).
137. See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text, especially note 78.
138. Vorenberg, supra note 14, at 694.
139. H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
140. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Through the 96th Congress, no version
of the code had passed both houses.
There have been three major versions of the criminal code in the Senate - S. 1,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1975); S. 1437, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1977), which was passed
by the Senate in January, 1978; and S. 1722, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1980). H.R. 6915,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) was the first major version of the Code to originate in
the House.
141. Specifically, these corresponding sections are: H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 2701 (1979) and S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1802 (1980). Unlike § 2701 of
the House Resolution, § 1802 of Senate Bill 1722 relaxes the jurisdictional require-
ments of RICO by not requiring that the enterprise be engaged in commerce.
Since virtually every government agency has some effect on interstate commerce
under current law, this change will have a minimal impact. See supra note 19.
142. "Enterprise" is defined in S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 111 (1980) and
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houses explicitly state that the statutory provisions carry forward
the current applicability of RICO to corrupt state and local offi-
cials.143 Senate Bill 1722 and House Resolution 6915 have bribery
provisions expressly applicable to state and local government offi-
cials.14 4 Both bills have extortion provisions which are clearly in-
tended to apply to local corruption to the same extent as the
Hobbs Act, as currently interpreted by the courts.145 Finally, both
versions of the code have fraud provisions which duplicate the
current coverage of local corruption by the Mail Fraud Act.146
H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2707 (1980). The more narrow definition in the
House version was apparently not intended to restrict the application of RICO to
local government units. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 371-72.
143. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., CRIMI-
NAL CODE REFORM ACT OF 1979, REPORT TO ACCOMPANY S. 1722 803 (1980) [herein-
after cited as JUDICIARY COMM. REPORT].
144. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1351 (1980), applies to a broad category of
"public servants" under jurisdictional requirements similar to those of the Travel
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1948). H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1751(c)(1) (1980), ap-
plies to a slightly narrower category of "public servants," but jurisdiction over
state and local officials is plenary. Philip Heymann, former Chief of the Criminal
Division of the DOJ, informed the House Committee that its provision may be vul-
nerable to constitutional attack because of the absence of traditional jurisdictional
requirements. Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on S. 1722, S. 1723
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 9926 (1979) (re-
print of Heymann statement to House) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]
Section 1751(b) of House Resolution 6915 imposes several procedural prerequi-
sites to a bribery prosecution of a local official "to preserve the balance between
state and federal interest" in light of the absence of jurisdictional restrictions.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 192. These procedural provisions are discussed
infra at notes 162-247 and accompanying text.
145. Both S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1722(c) (1980) and H.R. 6915, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2522(a) (1980) prohibit obtaining property of another under
"color of official right" which is the provision of the Hobbs Act frequently applied
to local corruption. The Judiciary Committee Report to accompany S. 1722 ex-
pressly approves the retention of the "color of right" offense because of the utility
of this provision in "ferreting out and punishing official corruption" under past
law. JUDICIARY COMM. REPORT, supra note 143, at 650. Section 1722(d) of Senate
Bill 1722 has alternative jurisdictional requirements similar to those of the Hobbs
Act ("affecting commerce") and the Travel Act.
Section 2522(d) of House Resolution 6915 retains a jurisdictional base involving
the effect of the offense on interstate commerce. However, § 2522 does not carry
forward the interstate-travel-and-facility jurisdiction over extortion that currently
exists under the Travel Act. Section 2522(c) of House Resolution 6915 has proce-
dural prerequisites to an extortion prosecution of a state or local official similar to
the bribery provisions of § 1751(b). See supra note 144.
146. H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2534(a) (1980) applies to "schemes to use
fraud with intent to ... deprive the citizens of a state or locality of the honest and
faithful services of a public servant of such state or locality .. " This provision
explicitly adopts the judicial interpretation of the more general statutory language
of the Mail Fraud Act which made that Act applicable to local corruption. S. 1722,
In carrying forward the broad coverage of local corruption by
current case law, the drafters were not unmindful of federalism-
based objections to broad federal concurrent jurisdiction. For ex-
ample, the Senate Judiciary Committee, in explicitly extending
the bribery provision of Senate Bill 1722 to local officials, noted
such objections and responded:
The true interests of Federalism are often better served by occasional
Federal intervention . . acting as an impetus to local vigilance than by a
legislatively-mandated hands-off policy leaving exclusive authority for en-
forcement of the bribery laws to the very officials who are most apt to be
the subject of bribery attempts. 147
The Senate Report did not indicate that the Committee rejected
more extensive or plenary jurisdiction over local bribery (section
1351) because of concerns about federalism.148
The provisions of the proposed code, discussed above, indicate
that Congress is capable of articulating at least the broad con-
tours of a federal criminal law policy on local corruption. All ma-
jor versions of the code concur on the broad policy issue of
whether local corruption should constitute a federal offense under
some circumstances. The current House and Senate versions de-
fine the specific substantive offenses applicable to local officials in
similar terms. Although the House and Senate differ on the juris-
dictional requirements for some offenses, both seem willing to es-
tablish jurisdiction over corruption that is at least as broad as that
under current statutory and case law.149 In sum, the broad policy
issues in the local corruption area seem ripe for legislative deter-
mination. Congress can and should enact legislation that speci-
96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1734 (1980) tracks the general language of the Mail Fraud
Act - "scheme or artifice to defraud." The Judiciary Committee Report makes
clear that § 1734 was intended to apply to conduct prohibited by the Mail Fraud
Act as currently interpreted. JuDiciARY COMM. REPORT, supra note 143, at 707, 709-
10.
The jurisdictional requirements of § 2534(d) of House Resolution 6915 and
§ 1734(e) of Senate Bill 1722 are similar. There is a federal jurisdiction over a
fraudulent scheme when, in the commission of the offense, the actor uses or
causes the use of the mails, interstate or foreign communication facilities, or trav-
els, or causes any other person to travel in interstate or foreign commerce.
147. JuDicLARY COMM. REPORT, supra note 143, at 406. See also HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 13, at 300-04.
148. JuDiciARY COMM. REPORT, supra note 143, at 406 n.47. See supra note 144.
Cf. the extortion provision of S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1722 (1980), which pro-
vides for broad "affecting commerce" jurisdiction.
149. Senate Bill 1722 and House Resolution 6915 differ significantly on the juris-
dictional elements of the bribery and extortion offenses. See supra notes 143-44.
They also differ slightly on the juridictional requirements of the racketeering pro-
vision. See supra note 141. Senate Bill 1722, with the slight variation for the rack-
eteering provision noted supra at note 141, carries forward the jurisdictional
coverage of current law. While the jurisdiction over extortion under House Reso-
lution 6915 is slightly narrower than current law, the plenary jurisdiction over brib-
ery is substantially broader. See supra notes 144-45.
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fies the substantive conduct and the jurisdictional circumstances
that may trigger federal prosecution of local corruption.
Congressional determination of the broad policy issues in this
area would assuage some, but not all, of the concerns about fed-
eral prosecutorial discretion discussed in Section III. Clear legis-
lative articulation of policy reduces the discretion of federal
prosecutors to develop their own legislative policy by creative ap-
plication of general statutory language.15 0
Under both versions of the proposed code, most instances of lo-
cal corruption could be prosecuted under several substantive pro-
visions. This overlap in coverage results in considerable
prosecutorial discretion to vary the charges and the possible pun-
ishment of similar conduct makes the criminal justice system less
fair.151 This article will later discuss how Congress might act to
reduce the potential for such unfairness.
All versions of the proposed code have expressly provided for
broad federal jurisdiction over local corruption. Plenary exercise
of that jurisdiction would result in federal prosecution of most
existing local corruption. To the extent Congress specifies the ju-
risdictional prerequisite for prosecution of local corruption, it
reduces concerns based on notions of comity. Exercise of juris-
diction in a way that alters the balance of powers between the
states and the federal government is less objectionable if Con-
gress has explicitly granted jurisdiction.52 However, exercise of
150. Congress, especially the Senate, seemed deferential to judicial interpreta-
tions of prior law in drafting the proposed code. For example, the Senate Judici-
ary Committee uncritically adopted the "affecting commerce" language as the
jurisdictional base in its "color of right" extortion provision (§ 1722) because the
current Hobbs Act has the same base. The Committee Report did not mention
possible federalism objections to the "affecting commerce" jurisdiction in § 1722.
JuDIciARY COMM. REPORT, supra note 143, at 652. However, in rejecting "affecting
commerce" jurisdiction for the bribery provisions of § 1351, the same report ex-
pressed concern that that "provision alone would probably reach every case of lo-
cal corruption in the country." Id. at 406 n.7. Under current law, federal
jurisdiction over state bribery law is under the Travel Act or RICO, neither of
which has "affecting commerce" jurisdiction.
Efforts by both bodies to limit the breadth of statutory coverage of local corrup-
tion prompted a concerted lobbying effort by the DOJ. In all instances, Congress
yielded and reincorporated provisions with the scope of current law. See supra
note 142 and accompanying text. To the extent Congress uncritically adopted
criminal law policy advanced by the DOJ and adopted by the courts, separation of
power concerns about prosecutorial law-making persist. See supra notes 68-77 and
accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
federal jurisdiction when it does not serve a substantial federal
interest is in tension with other notions of federalism. 153 'Subdivi-
sion three of this section will examine how Congress might act to
limit the exercise of federal jurisdiction over local corruption in
instances where such exercise serves a substantial federal
interest.
2. Narrowing Discretion Resulting from Substantive Overlap of
Federal Criminal Provisions
Under the proposed codes, a federal prosecutor enjoys signifi-
cant discretion to vary the range of possible punishment applica-
ble to particular misconduct by choosing the provision(s) under
which he will indict. For example, a common instance of local
corruption could be prosecuted under any or all of the bribery,
fraud, extortion, and racketeering provisions of either version of
the code.1 54 The maximum sanctions under the four applicable
provisions vary from five to twenty years imprisonment in the
153. See supra notes 85-115 and accompanying text.
154. Consider a local official who accepts several bribes from the same person
in return for favorable official actions. This conduct would support a prosecution
of the official under § 1351 of Senate Bill 1722 (bribery) if interstate travel or use of
the mails or a facility in interstate commerce was involved in the promotion, exe-
cution, or concealment of the offense. Section 1751 of House Resolution 6915
would apply without these jurisdictional elements, but a federal prosecutor would
have to satisfy the procedural requirements of § 1751(b) before indicting a local of-
ficial.
Accepting the bribes would be indictable as conduct executing an "artifice to de-
fraud" under § 1734 of Senate Bill 1722, given the jurisdictional elements required
by § 1351 of that bill. The Senate Judiciary Committee acknowledged that § 1734
was intended to encompass schemes to defraud citizens of the faithful services of
local officials. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. H.R. 6915, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 2534(a) (1) (C) (1980) explicitly covers the same type of scheme.
This conduct would constitute extortion under color of right, under § 1722(a) (2)
of Senate Bill 1722, since this offense does not require proof of actual or
threatened force or violence or fear. JUDICIARY Comm. REPORT, supra note 143, at
650. This conduct would also constitute extortion under § 2522(b) of House Reso-
lution 6915, but there are procedural prerequisites to the indictment of local offi-
cials in § 2522(c). Interstate travel or use of the mails or an interstate facility
would not be required to establish jurisdiction under § 1722 of Senate Bill 1722 if
the offense "affected" interstate commerce. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
§§ 1722(d)(1), 1721(c)(5) (1980). See also supra note 145. Similar "affecting com-
merce" jurisdiction exists in the House version. H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 2522(d) (1) (E) (1980). This jurisdictional base is very broad. See supra note 150.
The series of bribes, if they are interrelated, would support a prosecution under
§ 1802 of Senate Bill 1722, which is similar to RICO. The local official would be
guilty of conducting an enterprise-his local government office-through a "pat-
tern," defined in § 1807(e) of Senate Bill 1722, of racketeering activity which is de-
fined in § 1807(f) of the same bill to include state law bribery. Section 2701 of
House Resolution 6915 would similarly apply. See supra note 141.
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Senate Bill, and from 40 to 160 months in the House Resolution.155
Earlier versions of the proposed code provided for less overlap
in the substantive provisions applicable to local corruption. How-
ever, Congress restored the broad coverage of current case law,
apparently in response to Justice Department statements that
such coverage was necessary to adequately police local corrup-
tion.156 The most recent versions of the proposed code indicate
that Congress is more concerned with eliminating gaps in the fed-
eral criminal law coverage of local corruption than it is with creat-
ing an overlap in substantive provisions. However, neither
version attempts to limit or guide the resulting discretion of fed-
eral prosecutors in charging defendants under overlapping provi-
155.
Offense Felony Grade
S. 1722 Grade H.R. 6915 Grade
Bribery § 1351(b) C § 1751 C
Extortion under color of right § 1722(c) D § 2522 D
Fraud § 1734(d) D, E § 2534 D
Racketeering § 1802(b) B § 2701 B
Felony Grade Maximum Imprisonment
S. 1722 § 2301 H.R. 6915 § 3702
B 20 yrs. 160 mos.
C 10 yrs. 80 mos.
D 5 yrs. 40 mos.
156. An early draft of the House version of the proposed code omitted several
of the provisions added by House Resolution 6915 to reach local corruption. Origi-
nally, the bribery provision of § 1751 of the resolution was limited to elected "pub-
lic servants." The extortion provision of § 2522 did not include an "under color of
right" provision. The fraud provision was drafted so as to require the imposition
of economic loss and apparently did not reach schemes to deprive citizens of the
faithful services of public servants. The provisions were restored after Assistant
Attorney General Philip Heymann explained to the House Judiciary Committee
how their version was "inadequate" to effectively prosecute certain types of cor-
rupt activity;by certain officials. Senate Hearings, supra note 144, at 9925-26 (state-
ment of Philip Heymann before House Subcommittee). The draft of the House
Resolution was introduced to the Senate by Senator Kennedy as Senate Bill 1723
on Sept. 7, 1979. See Senate Hearings, supra note 144, at 11495.
The first draft of the Senate Bill (S. 1) omitted the "color of right" § 1722 extor-
tion provision. The Senate Judiciary Committee believed that the corrupt receipt
of property by a government official would be adequately covered by the bribery
provisions or the traditional extortion provisions. In defending the restoration of
the "color of right" provision in Senate Bill 1722, the Senate Report cited a con-
cerned letter from the DOJ which argued that the omission in S. 1 would render
"far more difficult" the prosecution of certain corrupt activity. Reform of Criminal
Laws: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1437, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 9240 (1977) (letter from Ass't A.G. Richard Thornburgh to Senator Mc-
Clellan, Feb. 19, 1976, reprinted). See also JuDicIARY Comm. REPORT, supra note
143, at 650 n.64.
sions.157 The prosecutor seems to be the appropriate party to
ultimately determine which of several applicable provisions
should be applied to particular misconduct.158
Nonetheless, it would be desirable for Congress to enact gen-
eral guidelines of prosecutorial charging discretion where federal
substantive provisions overlap substantially.159 Omissions in the
proposed codes indicate that Congress does not think it appropri-
ate to articulate even general guidelines at this time. However,
the DOJ has developed new guidelines for selecting charges
under a single indictment where more than one substantive provi-
sion is applicable.160 After the Department develops some experi-
ence with the new guidelines, Congress should consider enacting
similar general provisions to guide prosecutorial charging
discretion.161
3. Narrowing Prosecutorial Discretion to Exercise Concurrent
Federal Criminal Jurisdiction
Under current law, federal officials enjoy broad discretion to
prosecute local corruption even when no significant federal inter-
est would be served by prosecution. 162 The proposed federal
criminal codes create federal jurisdiction over local corruption
157. An early draft of the House version contained provisions barring multiple
or successive federal prosecutions based on the same specific instance of conduct
or criminal episode. These provisions were dropped from House Resolution 6915,
perhaps in response to the strong criticism of the proposed provision by Assistant
Attorney General Heymann. Senate Hearings, supra note 144, at 9939 (Addendum
to Statement of Heymann Before House Subcommittee). Otherwise, neither
house considered any provision to limit successive or multiple prosecutions or
multiple charging under a single indictment for the same conduct.
The discussion here will focus on prosecutorial discretion to vary charges under
a single indictment. The discretion of the prosecutor to vary the legal conse-
quences of similar misconduct is most clearly raised in this context. The related
problems of successive or multiple prosecutions based on the same conduct raises
numerous other issues not directly relevant to this discussion, e.g., resource con-
straints on the federal prosecutors and courts, double jeopardy, and related ideas.
158. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
159. See Vorenberg, supra note 14, at 694. See infra analogous argument made,
in more detail, at text accompanying notes 162-247. That section discusses the
desirablity of general legislative guidelines for federal discretion in prosecuting
conduct that is punishable under both state and federal law.
160. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION [here-
inafter cited as PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION].
161. A stronger argument can be made for immediate legislative enactment of
DOJ standards on successive prosecution. The Department has had internal
guidelines-the "Petite Policy"--on successive federal prosecutions since 1959.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS MANUAL, § 9-2.142 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as MANUAL]. The successful experience of the DOJ with these
guidelines seems to provide an adequate basis for enactment of statutory stan-
dards. See infra note 194 for an analogous argument made in greater detail.
162. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of federal-
ism concerns.
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that is at least as broad as under current law.163 Therefore, the
need to control the discretion of prosecutors to exercise federal
criminal jurisdiction over corrupt local officials is likely to survive
any contemplated federal law reform.164
The exercise of concurrent or "auxiliary" federal criminal juris-
diction "involves serious questions of policy concerning the ad-
ministration of the federal courts, the role of federal law
enforcement, and the possibility of usurping the state's enforce-
ment of their own criminal statutes."165 Consequently, "the
choice between an incursive or refrained enforcement 'policy in
the exercise of federal jurisdiction [should be considered] a legis-
lative function, and.., should not be abandoned so lightly as it
has been in the past."166
Congress could curtail federal prosecutorial discretion to exer-
cise concurrent jurisdiction by narrowing criminal jurisdiction
over local offenses. However, as Louis Schwartz argues:
[Tihe use of a particular jurisdictional circumstance in the definition of a
federal crime only very crudely marks off an area in which either (1) a
substantial national interest exists or (2) the states are incapable of effec-
tive action.... Rather than limiting the jurisdictional bases, the better
approach would be to delimit the bases and examine the nature and ex-
tent of the federal interest to be served by intervening in a given case. 16 7
The drafters of the recent versions of the proposed code appar-
ently agree, in large part, with Schwartz's view. In a few in-
stances, the proposed codes limit the jurisdictional bases for
provisions applicable to local corruption because of federalism
concerns.168 However, Congress clearly felt that broad grants of
concurrent jurisdiction169 were necessary to insure that federal
163. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
164. The proposed codes, unlike the Travel Act, enact federal definitions of ex-
tortion and bribery rather than incorporating a state law definition. Therefore,
under the proposed code, there may not be a complete overlap of state and federal
substantive provisions applicable to local corruption. However, the proposed fed-
eral definitions of bribery and extortion seem likely to reach most conduct prohib-
ited by state law. In addition, the proposed code sections carrying forward RICO,
-- S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1802 (1980), and H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 2701 (1980) -incorporate state law bribery and extortion.
165. See Continuing Debate, supra note 65, at 1415.
166. See Comment, supra note 2, at 1228; see also Frankfurter, supra note 73.
167. Schwartz, supra note 87, at 79.
168. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., the examples of plenary jurisdiction contained in H.R. 6915, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 1751 (1980) (bribery); see also supra notes 144, 145 & 150 and the
"affecting commerce jurisdiction" for extortion provisions in both versions of the
code.
jurisdiction was available "in the event state or local jurisdiction
cannot effectively be asserted." 170 The drafters of both versions
also recognized that federal jurisdiction will exist in numerous in-
stances where prosecution does not serve a substantial federal in-
terest.171 Section 115(a) of House Resolution 6915 and section
205(a) of Senate Bill 1722 both explicitly state that a grant of con-
current federal jurisdiction does not require that it be exercised
in every case. Both provisions require federal law enforcement
officials to consider whether a particular exercise of concurrent
jurisdiction serves an important federal interest before it is
exercised. 172
The National Commission for the Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws (Brown Commission) considered the feasibility of legisla-
tive rules specifying when an exercise of concurrent jurisdiction
was justified by the presence of a substantial federal interest.
The Commission concluded that "the factors involved are too
complex and too diverse"1 73 to permit the development of detailed
statutory standards for the exercise of federal criminal jurisdic-
tion. "The best that can be hoped for probably is to articulate cri-
teria in a more generalized form that will function as guidelines
for, and not limits on, the exercise of federal jurisdiction."174 The
Brown Commission proposed general guidelines in section 207 of
its proposed federal criminal code. 7 5
170. JuDIcIARY COMM. REPORT, supra note 143, at 51. See Senate Hearings,
supra note 144, at .9921-22 (statement of Philip Heymann before House
Subcommittee).
171. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 26-27.
172. H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 115(b)(c) (1980); S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 205(b) (1980). JUDICiARY COMM. REPORT, supra note 143, at 51, describes
the benefits of such a provision as follows:
A statutory command that federal prosecutors satisfy themselves as to the
existence of a substantial federal interest before instituting a federal pros-
ecution with respect to a concurrent jurisdiction crime could act to inhibit
the bringing of marginal federal cases and to guard against the excessive
use of the some necessarily broad jurisdictional grants ....
Id.
173. BROWN COMM'N PROPOSAL, supra note 90.
174. Abrams, supra note 75, at 57. Professor Vorenberg argues that in deter-
mining whether a legislative rule is the appropriate vehicle for narrowing execu-
tive discretion, one should consider.
[w] hether there is an adequate empirical basis for a decision and whether
there is sufficient acceptance of the advantages of a clear-cut pre-an-
nounced rule to justify the kind of long term arbitrary line drawing and
lumping of somewhat diverse cases that is involved in legislative action. If
an issue is not yet ripe for such clear-cut legislative determination, one
possible alternative is the use of legislative guidelines which identify the
factors to be taken into account or which indicate a preferential order
among possible actions to be taken.
Vorenberg, supra note 14, at 676.
175. Section 207 of BROWN COMM'N PRoposA , supra note 90 reads as follows:
§ 207. Discretionary Restraint in Exercise of Concurrent Jurisdiction
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Rather than set forth detailed rules, both Senate Bill 1722 and
House Resolution 6915 follow the lead of the Brown Commission
and establish general guidelines for the exercise of concurrent ju-
risdiction. Section 205(b) of Senate Bill 1722 lists six factors that
federal law enforcement officials should consider in determining
whether to exercise jurisdiction:
(1) the relative gravity of the federal offense and the state or local offense;
(2) the relative interest in federal investigation or prosecution;
(3) the resources available to the federal authorities and the state and lo-
cal authorities with respect to the offense;
(4) the traditional role of federal authorities and the state and local au-
thorities with respect to the offense;
(5) the interests of federalism; and
(6) any other relevant factors. 176
The factors listed in section 205 cover most of the general issues
a federal prosecutor should consider in deciding whether to exer-
cise concurrent jurisdiction. However, there are other more de-
tailed factors that are clearly relevant to the existence of a federal
interest in exercising concurrent jurisdiction. One factor, for ex-
ample, is whether the effectiveness of state and local law enforce-
ment has been substantially undermined by corruption.177
Senate Bill 1722 does not preclude federal prosecutors from con-
Notwithstanding the existence of concurrent jurisdiction, federal law en-
forcement agencies are authorized to decline or discontinue federal en-
forcement efforts whenever the offense can effectively be prosecuted by
nonfederal agencies and it appears that there is no substantial Federal in-
terest in further prosecution or that the offense primarily affects state, lo-
cal or foreign interests. A substantial federal interest exists in the
following circumstances, among others;
(a) the offense is serious and state or local law enforcement is im-
peded by interstate aspects of the case; (b) federal enforcement is be-
lieved to be necessary to vindicate federally-protected civil rights; (c) if
federal jurisdiction exists under section 201 (b), the offense is closely re-
lated to the underlying offense, as to which there is a substantial federal
interest; (d) an offense apparently limited in its impact is believed to be
associated with organized criminal activities extending beyond state
lines; (e) state or local law enforcement has been so corrupted as to un-
dermine its effectiveness substantially.
Id.
176. H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 115(b) (1980) requires the Attorney Gen-
eral to prescribe guidelines that federal law enforcement officers should consider
in determining- whether to exercise concurrent jurisdiction. Section 115(c) of
House Resolution 6915 provides that the Attorney General's guidelines should
take into account three factors, which correspond to factors (1) - (3) in Senate Bill
1722.
177. See mupra notes 90-93 and accompanying text for evidence indicating that
this factor is relevant to the existence of a substantial interest in federal prosecu-
tion. The Brown Commission's proposed § 207 listed law enforcement corruption
as a relevant factor in these terms.
sidering these factors;178 rather, it abdicates the task of specifying
when a federal interest in prosecution exists. However, since
these factors seem ripe for enactment as factors to be considered
in determining when concurrent jurisdiction should be exercised,
they should be specified in section 205.179
Section 115 of House Resolutions 6915 and section 205(b) of
Senate Bill 1722 are hortatory; they do not direct federal enforce-
ment officials to decline concurrent jurisdiction under any circum-
stances.180 Henry Friendly argues that Congress should direct
federal prosecutors to decline to exercise concurrent jurisdiction
according to the criteria specified in the Brown Commission's pro-
posed section 207.181 The following modified version of section 207
seems worthy of legislative enactment:
Notwithstanding the existence of concurrent jurisdiction, federal law en-
forcement agencies shall decline or discontinue federal enforcement ef-
forts whenever the offense can effectively be prosecuted by non-federal
agencies and it appears that there is no substantial federal interest in fur-
ther prosecution or that the offense primarily affects state, local or foreign
interests. A substantial federal interest exists in the following
circumstances:
(a) when the federal charges applicable to the offense are substantially
more serious than the applicable state, local or foreign charges;18 2
(b) when federal enforcement is believed necessary to vindicate feder-
ally-protected civil rights; 18 3
(c) when an offense, apparently limited in its impact is believed to be
associated with organized crime activities extending beyond state
178. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 205(b)(6) (1980) and the JUDICIARY COMM.
REPORT, supra note 143 at 53 n.112 make clear that prosecutors may consider other
factors-including corruption of state law enforcement-which are relevant. It is
unclear from the statutory language of H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 115 (1980)
or the HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 27 whether the Attorney General may con-
sider only those factors specified in § 115(c) of that resolution in developing his
guidelines.
179. See supra text of note 174.
180. H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 115(b) (1980) directs the Attorney General
to prescribe guidelines which provide for the declination of concurrent jurisdiction
absent a demonstrable, substantial federal interest. However, § 115(d) provides
that federal enforcement officials deciding whether to exercise concurrent jurisdic-
tion need only "consider" the Attorney General's guidelines. Section 115, there-
fore, is hortatory as regards federal prosecutors considering whether to exercise
federal jurisdiction.
181. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW, 61 (1973). Other
scholars have made similar proposals: see, e.g., Dobbyn, supra note 88, at 207; Ruff,
supra note 2, at 1226.
The Brown Commission proposal states that a federal prosecutor was author-
ized, not compelled, to decline jurisdiction under the circumstances specified. See
BROWN COMM'N PROPOSAL, supra note 90.
182. This subsection is based on S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 205(b)(1) (1980).
See supra note 109 and accompanying text for discussion of the relevance of this
factor to a federal interest in the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction.
183. BROWN COMM'N PROPOSAL § 207(b), supra note 90.
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lines;184
(d) when the offense is serious and state or local law enforcement is im-
peded by interstate aspects of the case;1
85
(e) when the offense is serious and impediments to state and local en-
forcement, due to inadequacies in local resources or expertise, cannot be
rectified by the cooperation of federal law enforcement officials; 18 6
(f) when state or local law enforcement has been so corrupted as to un-
dermine its effectiveness substantially;187
(g) other appropriate circumstances which the Attorney General may
publicly specify.18 8
This proposal seems ripe for enactment for several reasons.
First, the criteria it incorporates are the result of a thoughtful dis-
cussion in the academic literature that started with Louis
Schwartz's seminal article in 1948.189 After vigorous debate over
the last several years,190 Congress has recognized the need for
guidelines for the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction.191 Purely
184. BROWN COMM'N PROPOSAL § 207(d) supra note 90; see also supra notes 100-
02 and accompanying text.
185. BROWN COMM'N PROPOSAL § 207(a) supra note 90; see also supra note 99
and accompanying text.
186. This subsection was based on S.1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 205(b) (3)
(1980), but modified in response to concerns expressed supra at notes 103-08 and
accompanying text.
187. BROWN COMM'N PROPOSAL § 207(e), supra note 90. See also supra note 177.
188. The role of the Attorney General is discussed in more detail below. The
proposal omits the factors set out in S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 205(b) (2),
(b) (4) (1980); these factors are incorporated in the basic Brown Commission stan-
dard, see supra note 90, which requires consideration of state, local and federal in-
terests in the offense. The § 205(b) (5) clause, "the interests of federalism," was
omitted because this factor merely restates the basic issue in its broadest terms.
189. Schwartz, supra note 87; see also NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFr OF A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (1970);
ABRAMS, supra note 75; BROWN COMM'N PROPOSAL, supra note 90; FRIENDLY, supra
note 181; Ruff, supra note 2; Pauley, supra note 76.
190. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 144, at 9904 (statement of B. Civiletti,
Attorney General), 9921 (statement of Philip Heymann, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral), 9980 (statement of William Greenhalgh), 10072 (statement of Irving Sha-
piro); Legislation to Revise and Recodij Federal Criminal Law: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R.
6869, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 58-59, 2608-10, 2407, 257-58 (1978), (DOJ memoran-
dum, Comments of Business Roundtable, Testimony of G. Bell, Attorney General
and R. Gainer and R. Pauley, DOJ, respectively).
191. JUDICIARY COMM. REPORT, supra note 143 at 51-53; HousE REPORT, supra
note 13 at 26-27.
Earlier versions of the Senate bill had consciously omitted any provision like
the Brown Commission's § 207. S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1974) had, instead, a
provision that required the Attorney General to make annual reports setting out
the number of prosecutions under each category of jurisdiction to facilitate con-
gressional monitoring of the exercise of auxilliary jurisdiction by federal prosecu-
tors. Academicians argued that this provision would be totally ineffective in
limiting the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction. Ruff, supra note 2 at 1227. How-
hortatory guidelines, as one ranking staff attorney for the Senate
Judiciary Committee candidly admitted, would be largely
"cosmetic."192
Also, legislative specification of any binding criteria may dis-
courage the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction in some cases
where a federal interest, not anticipated by Congress, exists.
However, the relevant consideration is whether "the gross sum of
the deviation from the assumed legislative norm resulting from
individual judgments will exceed the deviation resulting from the
inability to make fine calibration under a non-discretionary sys-
tem."' 93 In any event, the proposal authorizes the Attorney Gen-
eral to develop supplementary criteria and thus provides a
mechanism for correcting congressional oversight. 94
ever, Congress was concerned with the DOJ's contention that a provision like § 207
would "become a source of continual and unnecessary litigation" or might subject
"the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to the risk of judicial review." COMM.
PAINT, supra note 81 at 35. Eventually, the Senate Judiciary Committee came to
believe that a provision like § 207 was desirable to protect against federal incur-
sion into the state's proper law enforcement domain. The drafters of S. 1722, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 205 (1980) concluded that an express non-litigability clause (dis-
cussed below) would prevent a rash of litigation. The DOJ concurred and re-
versed its earlier opposition to statutory guidelines. JUDICIARY COMM. REPORT,
supra note 143 at 52.
192. Interview with Ken Feinberg, Staff Attorney for the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 15, 1980).
193. Vorenberg, supra note 14 at 664.
194. It may be appropriate for Congress to specify additional guidelines for fed-
eral prosecution of defendants who had been previously prosecuted at the state
and local level for substantially the same conduct. The statutory standard could
draw on the Department of Justice's "Petite Policy," a policy involving dual and
successive prosecution. MANUAL, supra note 161. Senate Hearings, supra note 144,
at 9939 (statement of Philip Heymann to House Subcommittee). The Depart-
ment's policy "precludes the initiation or continuation of a federal prosecution fol-
lowing a state prosecution based on substantially the same act or acts ... unless
the state proceeding left substantial federal interests demonstrably unvindicated."
MANUA., supra note 161, at § 9-2.142. "The policy applies.., whenever there has
been a prior state proceeding (including a plea bargain) resulting in ... termina-
tion of the case on the merits." Id. The policy applies to dual prosecutions which
are not already barred by the double jeopardy clause. For a complete discussion
see Note, The Petite Policy, An Example of Enlightened Prosecutorial Discretion,
66 GEo. L. J. 1137, 1138 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Petite Policy].
The Department policy requires authorization by the appropriate Assistant At-
torney General of any dual prosecution covered by the guidelines. MANUAL, supra
note 161 at 20. The Manual lists several factors which the Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral should consider in determining whether a dual prosecution is necessary to
vindicate a substantial federal interest. A dual prosecution is not warranted un-
less: 1) the defendant was acquitted in the prior state trial and a federal conviction
is expected or 2) the defendant was convicted, but a federal conviction with an en-
hanced sentence is anticipated (perhaps because the maximum penalty under the
state charge is substantially less than the maximum penalty for the federal
charge. Id. at 20c. In addition, a subsequent federal prosecution may be
warranted:
where there is a substantial basis for believing that the choice by either
the prosecutor or the grand jury of the state charges which were filed or
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The criteria in the statutory proposal are general. Justice De-
partment experience in applying the general statutory guidelines
should facilitate the development of a more specific standard
which may eventually gain sufficient acceptance to justify statu-
tory enactment. Congress should authorize the Attorney General
to promulgate supplementary guidelines after consultation with
representatives of state and local government.195 For reasons dis-
cussed later in this article, I would suggest that these guidelines
be published.196
the state determination regarding guilt or severity of sentence was af-
fected by any of the following: ... (1) Infection of the state proceeding by
incompetence, corruption, intimidation, or undue influence; (2) court orjury nullification involving an important federal interest, in blatant disre-
gard of the evidence; (3) the failure of the state to prove an element of the
state offense which is not an element of the federal offense; or (4) the un-
availability of significant evidence in the state proceeding either because
it was not timely discussed or because it was suppressed on state law
grounds or on an erroneous view of the federal law.
Id. at § 9-2.142 (emphasis added).
Given the successful experience of the DOJ with the Petite Policy, the policy
seems ripe for legislative enactment. Assistant Attorney General Heymann op-
posed a legislative provision on dual prosecutions in an early draft of H.R. 6915,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980) on the grounds that legislation was unnecessary in
light of the existence of comprehensive DOJ policy. (The proposal, S. 1723, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 704 (1980), was substantially different from the Petite Policy and
was justly criticized by Heymann on several grounds. The proposal was dropped
from House Resolution 6915). Senate Hearings, supra note 144, at 9939 (statement
of Philip Heymann before House Subcommittee). However, the question of when
federal officials should prosecute activity already prosecuted at the state level in-
volves important issues of federalism and fairness of the criminal justice system.
Congress should address such important issues when they are ripe for legislative
action. See supra text of note 174.
195. BROWN COMMISSION PROPOSAL § 207 authorized the Attorney General to is-
sue additional guidelines. H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 115(e) (2) (1980) and S.
1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 205(c) (2) (1980) provide, more generally, that the At-
torney General shall "provide general direction to Federal law enforcement of-
ficers concerning the appropriate exercise of such federal jurisdiction .... The
purpose of this requirement.., is to bring about a more uniform and comprehen-
sive set of national guidelines to Federal ... prosecutors concerning the appropri-
ate exercise of concurrent jurisdiction crimes." JUDICIARY COMM. REPORT, supra
note 143, at 53.
Both § 205 of Senate Bill 1722 and § 115 of House Resolution 6915 provide that
the Attorney General should consult with state and local government representa-
tives concerning the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction. The requirement "is
designed to assure that the federal government takes into account State and local
views in setting its prosecutive priorities." Id.
196. The Senate Judiciary Committee intended that the Attorney General
would be able to meet his statutory obligation of providing "general direction" by
issuing informal guidelines or memoranda, as well as published regulations or for-
mal guidelines.
If the mandatory guidelines proposed are to have any impact,
an effective enforcement mechanism must be established. Con-
gress is clearly unwilling to authorize even limited judicial review
of the official application of statutory guidelines for the exercise
of jurisdiction.197 Section 205(c) (2) of Senate Bill 1722, and sec-
tion 115(e) (2) of House Resolution 6915, require the Attorney
General to "provide general direction to federal law enforcement
officers concerning the appropriate exercise" of concurrent juris-
diction.198 Section 205(c) (3) of Senate Bill 1722, and section
115(e) of House Resolution 6915, require the Attorney General to
report annually to Congress "concerning the extent of the exer-
cise of such federal jurisdiction during the preceeding fiscal
year."199 These enforcement mechanisms are completely inade-
quate.200 Congress should require that a high official, such as a
USA, certify that the statutory criteria are satisfied in each case
in which concurrent jurisdiction is exercised. 20 In addition, the
Attorney General should be required to set up a pre-prosecution
screening procedure within the Justice Department to insure lo-
cal compliance with both the statutory standards and supplemen-
tary guidelines.202
The bribery and extortion provisions of House Resolution 6915,
sections 1351, and 2522 respectively, impose certain procedural
197. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 205(e) (1980) expressly provides that no is-
sues relating to the propriety of an exercise of concurrent jurisdiction may be liti-
gated "except as may be necessary in granting leave to file a dismissal of an
indictment." JUDICIARY COMM. REPORT, supra note 143, at 54.
H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 115(d) (1980) and the HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 13, at 27 makes it clear that the House version was intended to preclude any
litigation under § 115. The Brown Commission's proposed § 207 similarly pre-
cluded litigation relating to the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by federal pros-
ecutors. See BROWN COMM'N PROPOSAL, supra note 90.
The problems with judicial review of prosecutorial discretion are discussed
supra, notes 127-35 and infra notes 263-69 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 195-96 for a discussion of the purpose of this provision.
199. The reporting requirement was "designed to provide Congress with infor-
mation that will flag any material increase or decrease in federal prosecution in
particular areas, thereby permitting inquiry to be made into the reasons for such
increase or decrease and prompting periodic evaluation of the proper scope of
Federal jursdiction in such areas." JUDICIARY Comm. REPORT, supra note 143, at 53.
200. One scholar argued that a reporting requirement like that in S. 1722, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 205(c) (3) (1980) would be ineffective in controlling the exercise
of concurrent jurisdiction:
Congress has not had a particularly good record as a post hoc supervisor
of law enforcement activities .... Even if the Senate or House Judiciary
Committee were to undertake an active review, they could not make any
sort of intelligent judgment about the exercise of discretion by the [DOJ]
based on the number of cases brought under various jurisdictional
headings.
Ruff, supra note 2, at 1227.
201. N. ABRAMS, supra note 75, at 60-61.
202. FRIENDLY, supra note 181, at 61.
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prerequisites to a federal prosecution of a state or local official.
These sections provide that no state or local public servant shall
be prosecuted:
unless within 30 days of the return of the indictment... but in no event
later than the attachment of jeopardy-
(A) the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General designated
by the Attorney General certifies that -
(i) before the return of the indictment, the appropriate State or local
prosecuting agency was informed of the proposed Federal prosecution and
such agency acquiesced in the Federal prosecution; or
(ii) at the time of the indictment there was no pending State prosecu-
tion against the actor involving the conduct constituting a violation of this
section, and, in the judgment of the Attorney General or Assistant Attor-
ney General, the State was not about to undertake such a prosecution; or
(B) the Attorney General certifies that the Federal prosecution is re-
quired by the interests of justice. The certification function under this
subsection shall not be delegated.
2 0 3
The notion that the statutory limits on the exercise of concur-
rent jurisdiction should be more stringent for particularly sensi-
tive offenses is a sound one; but the procedural requirements
should be reformulated in the following manner. The certification
should be in terms of "a substantial federal interest," a meaning-
ful standard in the modified Brown Commission proposal, rather
than an undefined, vague standard like "the interests of justice."
The certification function might be more appropriately handled
by the Chief of the Criminal Division or even the Chief of the
Public Integrity Section. Certification by such an official would be
adequate to meet federalism concerns about the exercise of fed-
eral jurisdiction. However, certification by a ranking Justice De-
partment official, rather than by local USA's, would be advisable
in light of the extreme sensitivity of the federalism issue in the
local corruption context.204
Certification of a substantial federal interest need not be re-
quired if the appropriate state or local enforcement officials con-
203. H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1351(b)(2), 2522(c)(2), 2523(e)(2) (1980)
(blackmail provisions). The provisions apply to prosecutions of state and local of-
ficials where the offense relates to their official position.
204. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13,
at 300-03 indicates that the procedural requirements of House Resolution 6915
were imposed in recognition of the special importance of federalism issues in this
context. Certification, especially at the level of the Chief of the Public Integrity
Section, would not impose an unwieldy burden on the DOJ. Every prosecution of
a state or local official is already reviewed by the section as a matter of Depart-
ment policy. The number of local corruption cases prosecuted annually by the
DOJ is less that 300. Id. at 302.
sent to federal prosecution. 205 However, the mere fact that a state
or local prosecution does not seem imminent is an insufficient
justification for a federal prosecution. 206
The procedural prerequisites are not imposed by House Resolu-
tion 6915 for two other provisions that are freely applicable to lo-
cal corruption: section 2534 (corresponding to the Mail Fraud
Act) and section 2701 (corresponding to RICO). Fecteralism con-
cerns about prosecution of corrupt officials under these provisions
are no less poignant than under the bribery and extortion provi-
sions. The procedural requirements, as modified, should be appli-
cable to all prosecutions of local officials for corruption.
C. Department of Justice Action to Narrow Prosecutorial
Discretion
The prospects for passage of a new federal criminal code are
uncertain at best. Therefore, broad prosecutorial discretion to de-
velop and execute law enforcement policy is likely to persist. If
this broad executive discretion must exist, it should be exercised,
to the extent practicable, by the DOJ, not by local USA's and their
assistants. To the extent possible, the DOJ should control
prosecutorial discretion with public rules and guidelines. 207 :
The DOJ is better suited than local federal prosecutors to de-
velop judicious national law enforcement policy. "Individual U.S.
Attorneys cannot develop policy that will be effective outside
their own districts and, as products of a local political appoint-
ment process, they are ill-suited to making major national policy
decisions." 208 Local USA's have substantial "front line" law en-
forcement responsibilities which preclude the allocation of sub-
stantial resources to thoughtful development of comprehensive
policy. The DOJ, by contrast, can and does devote substantial re-
sources to policy analysis and development.20 9 Moreover, an ex-
ecutive agency in Washington is likely to be more responsible to
Congress in developing policy than geographically scattered
USA's. Under our system of separation of powers, it is desirable
for those officials of the executive exercising delegated "lawmak-
205. Consent by state or local officials indicates that federal prosecution would
not constitute an unwarranted infringement on state law enforcement powers. See
supra note 95 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 96-98, 179-87 and accompanying text.
207. Vorenberg, supra note 14, at 655.
208. Beck, supra note 122, at 374-75.
209. The DOJ has a separate Office of Policy and Management Analysis. More-
over, the Criminal Division allocates substantial resources to policy analysis. See,
e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL PRIORrrES FOR THE INVESTIGATION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1980) [hereinafter cited as WHITE
COLLAR PRIORITIES].
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ing" powers to be accountable to Congress. 2 10
If the Justice Department can effectively secure local compli-
ance with national policy, greater uniformity in the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion should result. Consistency in the exer-
cise of discretion enhances the fairness of the criminal justice
system. 11 Effective implementation of DOJ policy should also re-
sult in improved allocation of limited federal enforcement re-
sources and better coordination of federal, state, and local law
enforcement activities. 212
1. DOJ Development of Broad Policy-Enforcement Priorities
It was earlier proposed in this article that Congress, not execu-
tive officials, should develop broad federal law enforcement pol-
icy. However, it seems clear that 'Congress has implicitly
delegated to federal prosecutors the power "to formulate rules of
enforcement that are effectively less proscriptive of conduct than
are parallel criminal statutes."213 The courts have implicitly rec-
ognized the power of prosecutors to selectively enforce all-encom-
passing criminal prohibitions by refusing to review the exercise of
prosecutorial charging discretion.214 If individual federal prosecu-
tors enjoy de facto discretion to develop enforcement priorities,
the DOJ should take steps to guide and limit that discretion.215
210. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
212. Id. at 43. See PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION, supra note 160 at i-ii;
see also WHITE COLLAR PRIORITIES, supra note 209, at 43.
213. Beck, supra note 122, at 339-41.
As the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administra-
tion of Justice noted, "[TIhe criminal code of any jurisdiction tends to
make a crime of everything that people are against, without regard to en-
forceability, changing social concepts, etc."... The sheer volume of viola-
tions created by the broad statutory coverage of criminal behavior
necessitates the exercise of extensive prosecutorial discretion .... Con-
gress has taken no legislative action to date to reverse the broad use of
discretion. Therefore, Congress has at least acquiesced in prosecutor's
current use of impliedly granted "lawmaking" powers.
Id.
214. See supra notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text. The historical development
of local political corruption as a federal law enforcement priority highlights the
problems inherent in independent policy making by local USA's. The early federal
prosecutions of local corruption were independently initiated by a few local USA's.
The local USA's made no effort to articulate, in writing, the policies they were im-
plementing at the time. The policies therefore were immune from public and leg-
islative scrutiny and vulnerable to ad hoc application. Local practice with respect
to local corruption varied across federal districts. Many of the early local corrup-
The DOJ recently completed a study which sought to determine
which white-collar offenses should be most vigorously prosecuted
by its component agencies. 216 The methodology of the study was
systematic217 and, on the whole, sound.218 The result evidenced
by the DOJ's publication, National Priorities for the Investigation
and Prosecution of White Collar Crime, represents effective de-
velopment and articulation of broad national law enforcement
policy.
"The process of developing . . . policy within the Department
may have some limiting effect on prosecutorial discretion, and the
very existence of such policy in writing may serve to inhibit
abuses of discretion."219 However, for at least two reasons, the
White Collar Priorities study is likely to fall short of its professed
tion prosecutions were inconsistent with DOJ policies in force at the time. Several
local policies seemed insensitive to state and local law enforcement interests and
"activist in the extreme." Ruff, supra note 2, at 1205-06, 1211-12; Loomis, supra
note 61, at 78.
216. See WHrrE COLLAR PRIORrrIEs, supra note 209, at 5.
217. The study began with extensive data collection from DOJ personnel across
the country who were involved in the enforcement of white collar offenses. Re-
spondents identified five to ten white collar crimes as enforcement priorities on
the basis of specified criteria and provided detailed information about those
crimes. Id. at 2-4. The DOJ analyzed the data and developed national priorities on
the basis of the designation of offenses as priorities by local residents and other
criteria, including: 1) the pervasiveness of the illegal activity; 2) the nature of the
victims and the nature and extent of their losses, especially the impact of the of-
fense on the integrity of public institutions; 3) the status of perpetrators, e.g.,
whether they occupy special positions of trust; 4) the need for federal law enforce-
ment involvement, determined by the level and effectiveness of state and local law
enforcement activity; and 5) the benefits and costs resulting from increased fed-
eral emphasis. Id. at 7-8.
The report stated that the DOJ would annually update its data base and reevalu-
ate the priorities to insure that policy stays current with legal and social trends.
Id. at 46.
218. The DOJ study relied primarily on objective and subjective data collected
from federal enforcement officials. One general danger of the limited data base is
that the DOJ will uncritically perpetuate deficiencies in regional federal enforce-
ment policies. For example, the DOJ guidelines might perpetuate the poor judg-
ment of local federal officials who vigorously prosecute local political corruption
without adequately considering the special interests of states and localities in lo-
cal enforcement. See supra notes 81, 215 and accompanying text. The DOJ recog-
nized the potential dangers of its limited data base and "supplemented" the
information gathered with the independent judgments of the Criminal Division
and other DOJ personnel in Washington. The DOJ also elicited the view of non-
federal sources such as the National District Attorneys Association, albeit less
systematically. WHrrE COLLAR PRIORrriEs, supra note 209, at 4.
The results of the DOJ's analysis seems acceptable, at least in the local corrup-
tion area. In targeting corruption of major state and local officials as a federal en-
forcement priority, see infra note 221, the DOJ study seemed sufficiently
deferential to state and local interests. The report strongly implied that policing of
local corruption should be left to local agencies when they can do so effectively,
and provide the assistance of federal investigators and prosecutors only if neces-
sary. WHrE COLLAR PRIORITIES, supra note 209, at 15.
219. Beck, supra note 122, at 337.
[Vol. 10: 321, 19831 Political Corruption
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
goals of improved coordination of federal enforcement resources,
and increased consistency and equal justice in federal law en-
forcement. 220 First, the categories of offenses designated as na-
tional priorities are often so broad as to leave substantial
discretion to local prosecutors. For example, the study designates
"corruption of major state and local officials" as a national prior-
ity,22 1 but leaves to USA's the power to develop priorities among
the numerous types of misconduct which comprise the broader
category.222 Second, the national priorities are not mandatory223
and responsibility for local implementation is left largely to
USA's.224
The DOJ should continue to systematically develop broad law
enforcement policy in important areas of federal concern. How-
ever, the DOJ must articulate its policy in more detail so that it
can be effectively enforced, and it must design more effective
mechanisms for local implementation of that policy. This article
220. WHITE COLLAR PRIORITIES, supra note 209, at 43.
221. Id. at 16. The study designated six national priorities in this area
including:
5. Corruption involving major state government officials, elected, ap-
pointed or civil service, including but not limited to governors, legislators,
department or agency heads, court officials, law enforement officials at
policymaking or managerial levels, and their staffs, or corruption of their
state employees, including regulatory commission or board members,
where such corruption is systemic.
6. Corruption involving major local government officials, elected, ap-
pointed or civil service, including but not limited to mayors, city council
members or equivalents, city managers or equivalents, department or
agency heads, court officials, law enforcement officials at policymaking or
managerial level, and their staffs, or corruption of other local employees
* * . where such corruption is systemic.
Id. at 16. But cf. the more specific guidelines for federal prosecution of local cor-
ruption proposed infra note 244, and accompanying text.
222. WHiTrE COLLAR PRIORITIES, supra note 209, at 15.
223. The priorities are to be viewed by federal prosecutors "as guideposts and
indicators of the types of white collar crime that deserve special emphasis." Id. at
48.
224. The report notes Attorney General Order No. 817-79 which calls for the de-
velopment, by each USA, "of specific priorities within the national policy that are
peculiar to their federal district, with the concurrence of the [Chief I of the Crimi-
nal Division." WHITE COLLAR PRIORITIES, supra note 209, at 43. The DOJ will ask a
limited number of USA's to develop district priorities initially but will ask every
USA to do so over the next two years. Id. at 43-44, 46. "[These] district priorities
should be used as a means of coordinating and focusing federal law enforcement
resources devoted to white collar crime" in each federal district. Id. at 44. The
success of local USA's in complying with district and national priorities will be
monitored, by collection and analysis of data on the number of priority cases han-
died in each district. Id.
will later consider how the DOJ might accomplish these objec-
tives in the area of local corruption.
*2. DOJ Guidelines to Narrow Discretion Resulting from
Overlap of Federal Criminal Statutes
It has been illustrated that the substantive overlap of statutory
provisions applicable to local corruption gives federal prosecutors
significant discretion to vary the criminal charges applied to par-
ticular criminal conduct. Because it is unlikely that Congress will
take steps to limit this type of discretion, the DOJ must establish
guidelines for the exercise of discretion in charging defendants in
local corruption cases.
The DOJ's 1980 publication, Principles of Federal Prosecution,
provides general standards for the exercise of prosecutorial
charging discretion. Part C of that publication provides that, in
general, a prosecutor should charge "the most serious offense that
is consistent with the nature of the defendant's conduct, and that
is likely to result in a sustainable conviction." 225 The prosecutor
should also charge other offenses only when additional charges:
"(a) are necessary to ensure that the ... indictment (i) ade-
quately reflects the nature and extent of criminal conduct in-
volved; and (ii) provides the basis for an appropriate sentence
under all the circumstances of the case; or (b) will significantly
enhance the strength of the government's case. ... "226
The charging guidelines exhibit the general flaws of the Princi-
ples of Federal Prosecution publication.227 The standards are
general and therefore subject to inconsistent application, and not
amenable to effective review. The guidelines are hortatory and
not backed up with an effective internal enforcement mecha-
nism. 228 More specific, mandatory DOJ standards are necessary
to promote uniform charging of criminal defendants who commit
similar wrongs.
3. DOJ Guidelines for the Exercise of Concurrent Jurisdiction
The need for general statutory guidelines for the exercise of con-
current federal jurisdiction and more detailed, supplementary
225. PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION, supra note 160.
226. WHITE COLLAR PRIORrITES, supra note 209, at 17-18.
227. See infra notes 229-47 and accompanying text for a further discussion of
PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION.
228. Cf. Petite Policy, supra note 194, which requires that successive federal
prosecutions for the same criminal conduct be approved by an AUSA. The Petite
Policy guidelines, although in existence since 1959, have also been criticized by
some as being unnecessarily general. Petite Policy, supra note 194, at 1137-38.
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DOJ guidelines was discussed earlier in this article.229 If Con-
gress fails to pass such guidelines, DOJ efforts to control local dis-
cretion in the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction will be of critical
importance.
In the August, 1980 publication of Principles of Federal Prosecu-
tion, the DOJ published general guidelines for declining prosecu-
tion.230 Those guidelines provide that a DOJ attorney should not
initiate a prosecution if "in his judgment, prosecution should be
declined because ... (a) no substantial federal interest would be
served by prosecution; [or] (b) the person is subject to effective
prosecution in another jurisdiction. ... 231 These guidelines con-
tain a list of factors which the prosecutor should weigh in deter-
mining when a substantial interest in federal prosecution exists.
Some of the factors232 listed include: "(a) federal law enforcement
priorities; 233 (b) the nature and seriousness of the offense;... (d)
the person's culpability in connection with the offense;234 [and]
(g) the probable sentence or other consequences if the person is
convicted."
The guidelines also list factors which the federal prosecutor
should consider in deciding whether to decline prosecution be-
cause the suspect is subject to effective state or local prosecu-
tion:235 "(a) the strength of the other jurisdiction's interest in
prosecution;236 (b) the other jurisdiction's ability and willingness
to prosecute effectively; 237 and (c) the probable sentence or other
consequences if the person is convicted in the other
229. See upra notes 163-66, 195 and accompanying text.
230. PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION, supra note 160.
231. Id. at 6.
232. Id. at 7.
233. PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION, supra note 160, was published at the
same time as the WHrrE COLLAR PRIORrrIES, supra note 209.
234. "[Clircumstances, such as the fact that the accused occupied a position of
trust or responsibility which he violated in committing the offense, might weigh in
favor of prosecution." PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION, supra note 160, at 10,
comment (g).
235. Id. at 11.
236. The comments state that the federal interest in prosecution is less sub-
stantial when the offense is of particular interest to state or local authorities, e.g.,
because of the nature of the offense or the identity of the offender or the victim.
Id. at 12, comment (a).
237. In assessing the ability of localities to prosecute effectively, the comments
suggest that the prosecutor consider the adequacy of local law enforcement re-
sources and "any local conditions, attitudes, relationships ... that might cast
doubt on the likelihood of the state or local authorities conducting a thorough and
successful prosecution." Id. at 12, comment (b).
jurisdiction."238
The guidelines are subject to two fundamental criticisms. First,
Principles of Federal Prosecution does not itself provide for effec-
tive enforcement of its guidelines. The preface states that the
principles were designed "with a view to providing guidance
rather than mandating results." 239 For reasons analogous to those
offered in the discussion of legislative guidelines for the exercise
of concurrent jurisdiction, DOJ guidelines should be
mandatory.240 A related criticism is that the guidelines are un-
necessarily general in articulating the factors a federal official
should consider in declining prosecution. Factors at least as de-
tailed as those proposed for legislative enactment earlier in this
article2 4 1 seem ripe for promulgation as published DOJ
guidelines. 242
The DOJ should have sufficient knowledge of the relative en-
forcement capabilities of the states and the federal government in
order to develop guidelines specifying when federal intervention
will be justified because of inadequate state enforcement capac-
ity. The DOJ should also be able to articulate more specific guide-
lines indicating when there is a federal interest in the prosecution
of particular types of offenses such as local corruption. Charles
Ruff, an experienced DOJ attorney, has proposed workable, spe-
cific guidelines for the prosecution of official corruption at the dif-
ferent levels of state and local government. He proposes, for
238. Id.
239. Id.at i-ii. The Principles of Prosecution provide for enforcement of the
guidelines to some extent. It is stated that:
[e]ach United States Attorney and responsible Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral should establish internal office procedures to insure (a) that
prosecutorial decisions .. .are made consistent with these provisions;
and (b) that serious, unjustified departures from the principles set forth
herein are followed by such remedial action, including the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions when warranted, as are deemed appropriate.
Id., Part A, pt. 3.
But many of the specific guidelines are discretionary or hortatory and thus not
subject to effective enforcement. The declination standard, for example, does not
mandate declination of prosecution when no substantial federal interest would be
served by prosecution.
240. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 182-88 and accompanying text.
242. To determine the feasibility of more detailed agency guidelines, one must
consider whether-
the policies and practices of the official or agency relating to the issue for
decision [are] clear enough so that it makes sense that they be promul-
gated subject to future change? There will be different degrees of confi-
dence in the detailed elaboration of such policies and practices and in
their ripeness for disclosure as guides to agency action, and the determi-
nation of whether formal rule-making, publication of operating manuals or
directives, or informal guidelines should be used might depend on these
differences.
Vorenberg, supra note 14, at 676 (citation omitted).
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example, that federal officials should decline prosecution of cor-
ruption at the mayoral level if such corruption "does not subvert
federal funds or [interfere] with federal programs."24 3 Ruff ar-
gues that there is no substantial federal interest in the prosecu-
tion of a corrupt state judge unless "his acts had some direct
impact on federal enforcement." 2 "
The DOJ has established few specific guidelines for federal
prosecutors in the local corruption context.245 The United States
Attorney's Manual does provide for review of every federal prose-
cution of a corrupt local official by the Public Integrity Section of
the DOJ.246 However, the Public Integrity Section has not for-
mally promulgated criteria for review of proposed local corruption
prosecutions. An attorney in the section admitted that many
USA's may not fully understand the criteria used in evaluating
prosecution requests.247 The DOJ should be able to articulate
guidelines for the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction over corrupt
officials that are as specific as Ruffs proposals.
4. Internal Enforcement of DOJ Guidelines
It has been proposed that the DOJ should be able to develop
243. Ruff, supra note 2, at 1215.
244. Id. at 1214-18.
245. PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION, supra note 160, does not attempt to
develop specific guidelines for particular substantive areas. WHI'rE CoLLAR PRIORI-
TIES, supra note 209, does not attempt to specify the relative federal interest in
prosecution of different types of local corruption. The DOJ left to local USA's the
power to differentiate between particular types of local corruption. See supra
notes 222, 224 and accompanying text. A recent DOJ report to Congress revealed
that none of the USA's surveyed had local declination policies for local corruption
offenses that considered the federal interest in prosecution. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, U.S. ATrORNEys' WRrI'rEN GUIDELINES FOR THE DECLINATION OF ALLEGED
VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW: A REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS (1979).
The United States Attorneys' Manual, with one exception, does not have special
substantive guidelines for the prosecution of local political corruption. MANUAL,
supra note 161, at § 9-131.180. It contains a few guidelines for "color of right" pros-
ecutions under the Hobbs Act. Id. For example, USA's should prosecute officials
only when significant amounts of money and reasonably high levels of office are
involved, and only where there is a relatively clear effect of the corrupt conduct on
legitimate interstate commerce. Id. at 23. The expressed purpose of these guide-
lines was to avoid a weak case reaching the Supreme Court as the first "color of
right" prosecution to be reviewed. Id.
246. MANUAL, supra note 161, at § 9-1.103(7) (1982).
247. Radek Interview, supra note 11. Radek did say that the Public Integrity
Section holds seminars two times a year to explain to local federal prosecutors its
screening procedures. The Section will explain to the relevant prosecutor the
grounds for the denial of a particular prosecution request. Id.
specific guidelines for the exercise of federal jurisdiction over lo-
cal political corruption. If the standards are to have a substantial
impact, they should be made mandatory, not merely advisory.
Lee Radek, of the DQJ's Public Integrity Section, argues that
mandatory national guidelines are undesirable because they limit
the flexibility of USA's in responding to local variations. 248 How-
ever, DOJ guidelines may permit USA's to supplement or even
vary national guidelines if written local variations are approved
by the appropriate AUSA.249
Current DOJ policy provides for review of each proposed prose-
cution of a currupt local official by the Public Integrity Section.250
If the Department develops specific, mandatory written guidelines
for prosecution of local corruption,25 1 this enforcement procedure
seems adequate.
5. Publication of DOJ Guidelines
Policy guidelines developed by the DOJ should, as a general
rule, be published.252 Publication will promote public confidence
that the official discretion of federal prosecutors is exercised, not
on an ad hoc basis, but according to objective standards. The
public has a right to notification of changes in the substantive law
effected by agency guidelines. 25 3 When guidelines are not pub-
licly available, the benefit of knowledge of substantive policy is
limited to those with inside information, for example, former DOJ
attorneys now members of the defense bar.254
Publication is likely to substantially improve the guidelines de-
veloped. Agencies are apt to exercise greater care in drafting
guidelines that are to be made public.25 5 Publication facilitates
critical public feedback on DOJ policy, which may induce im-
248. Id.
249. WHrrE COLLAR PRIORTES, supra note 209, provides a similar mechanism
for giving flexibility to local USA's within the framework of national policy stan-
dards. Id. at 43-44. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
250. The Public Integrity Section generally reviews a prosecution memoran-
dum and a draft indictment before approving the indictment of a corrupt local offi-
cial. If the Section denies a prosecution request, the local USA may appeal to the
Deputy Assistant, Assistant, and Deputy Attorney Generals, in succession. Radek
Interview, supra note 11.
251. Currently the Public Integrity Section has not formally promulgated crite-
ria for screening local corruption prosecutions. Id.
252. There may be issues on which DOJ "policies and practices are simply too
incoherent to provide a basis for any advance statement of how decisions will be
made." Vorenberg, supra note 14, at 676-77. When such issues are decided in a
particular case, the DOJ should at least announce and explain the decision after
the fact. Id.
253. Beck, supra note 122, at 335.
254. Abrams, supra note 133, at 27.
255. N. ABRAMs, supra note 75, at 58-60.
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provements. 256 Moreover, publication undoubtedly will promote
more conscientious compliance by local prosecutors by facilitat-
ing public scrutiny of their compliance.
The frequently raised objections to the publication of DOJ
guidelines do not seem compelling. For several reasons, the argu-
ment that publication of selective enforcement policy will reduce
deterrence is flawed. Guidelines will generally not be so clear
and rigid as to induce confident reliance on the part of the few po-
tential offenders who seek to modify their conduct to exploit the
standards. For guidelines under federal statutes that incorporate
state offenses, the clear threat of state prosecution may mitigate
any reduction in deterrence attributable to publication of federal
selective enforcement policy. Because so few violators are actu-
ally detected, a change in the percentage of offenders prosecuted
after apprehension may have a minor impact on the deterrent ef-
fect of the criminal law.257 Finally, "[d]isclosure [ of prosecutorial
policy] may help reduce criminality by making punishment seem
more certain for those offenses for which an Assistant United
States Attorney's discretion is restricted. It may also encourage
public commitment to and trust in the crimnal adjudication sys-
tem where secrecy currently creates suspicion, resentment and
pessimism."25 8
It seems unlikely that publication of DOJ policy will result in
"freezing" agency policy or in substantially deterring the develop-
ment of agency policy. If DOJ policy is made prospective only,
public reliance will not present a substantial impediment to pol-
icy change.259 Nor is the DOJ likely to stop developing guidelines;
it is too strongly interested in controlling local enforcement policy
in controversial areas.260
Some have argued that publication of enforcement policy will
provide the defense bar with new, unjustified leverage and will
spawn litigation challenging the execution of enforcement policy.
However, even now, many members of the defense bar manage to
learn of enforcement policy through inside information. Publica-
256. Abrams, supra note 133, at 25-27.
257. Noll, Controlling a Prosecutor's Screening Discretion Through Fuller En-
forcemen 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 697, 728-30 (1978).
258. Neumann, The New Era of Administrative Regularization: Controlling
Prosecutorial Discretion Through the Administrative Procedure Act, 3 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 23, 32-33 (1978).
259. Beck, supra note 122, at 357.
260. Neumann, supra note 258, at 35-36.
tion merely assures that such information will be equally accessi-
ble to all. Furthermore, the judiciary has shown a reluctance to
consider challenges to discretionary prosecutorial conduct.26 1
Recently, the DOJ has published several documents articulat-
ing general departmental policy.262 More specific guidelines, such
as those in the United States Attorneys' Manual and various De-
partmental memorandum, have not been published, but may be
procurred, in most cases, under the Freedom of Information
Act.263 Procurement under that Act is, however, inconvenient and
expensive. Publication remains desirable to ensure that DOJ pol-
icy standards become readily accessible to all, on equal terms.
6. Judicial Review of DOJ Guidelines
The courts are apparently unwilling to review the substance or
the application of written prosecutorial policy. "There is an al-
most total absence of case law in the United States on the subject
of whether a particular prosecutorial policy was beyond the
power of the prosecutor to formulate."2 64 Also:
[d] espite a general rule that federal courts will review and penalize a fed-
eral agency for its failure to comply with its own ... announced policies,
no federal court has allowed review of a claim against the Department of
Justice for non-compliance with one of its published policies relating to
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 2
6 5
An immediate expansion of judicial review of prosecutorial pol-
icy which is performed at the behest of the defendant, does not
seem desirable.
The extent to which an administrator's violations of his own guidelines
provides a basis for judicial relief may affect not only the punctiliousness
of his own compliance, but also his willingness to issue the guidelines,
since permitting such challenges would open up a new major level of liti-
gation, with more resulting delay and a need for greater resources. 2 6 6
261. See infra notes 264-70 and accompanying text.
262. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION, supra note 161; WHITE COL-
LAR PRIORITIEs, supra note 209.
263. Beck, supra note 133, at 353. "Congress and the courts have required dis-
closure of policies analygous to prosecutorial policy ... except when the sole ef-
fect would be circumvention of a valid agency regulation." Id.
264. Abrams, supra note 133, at 42. Beck, supra note 122, at 322-37, has con-
cluded that prosecutorial guidelines are not reviewable under the Administrative
Procedure Act, as are certain administrative rules and regulations.
265. Pauley, supra note 76, at 497-98. The Supreme Court will remand a federal
criminal case for dismissal on the grounds that the DOJ did not follow its own pol-
icy guidelines, if the Solicitor General confesses the error and calls for the Court
to vacate the conviction. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 422 U.S. 1032 (1975).
However, Rinaldi, 434 U.S. at 28-29, 31 "implies that the Departmental policy
would not be enforced over the government's objection and this implication is con-
sistent with the unanimous decisions of the courts of appeals." Pauley, supra note
76, at 498 n.137. See also United States v. Snell, 592 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Howard, 590 F.2d 564 (4th Cir. 1979).
266. Vorenberg, supra note 14, at 682-83. The DOJ strongly opposes judicial re-
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"Allowing review of DOJ guidelines or their application ...
would prompt a rash of litigation; it would become routine for a
defendant in a criminal case to fie a motion challenging the exer-
cise of discretion underlying the determination to seek an indict-
ment ... against him."267 Moreover, the courts are ill-suited to
review, for example, a determination by a prosecutor that a par-
ticular exercise of concurrent jurisdiction serves a substantial
federal interest. 2 6 8 Overall:
it would not be unreasonable for a legislature to see the process of limit-
ing discretion as one proceeding in stages over a long period and to con-
clude that it would not allocate resources to ... challenges [by the
defendant, of prosecutorial policy] unless a system of public reporting re-
vealed that the regulations themselves or the degree of agency compliance
with them were unsatisfactory.269
DOJ guidelines, such as those proposed in this article to control
the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction, are designed primarily to
deal with those federalism-based concerns identified in Part III of
this article. Therefore, it may be advisable to allow state Attor-
neys General to challenge, in court, DOJ policy that is perceived
as an unwarranted or legislatively unauthorized infringement on
state law enforcement power. This procedure would create an ex-
ternal check on the discretion of federal officials while avoiding
many of the disadvantages of judicial review initiated by the crim-
inal defendant.270
view of a federal prosecutor's application of DOJ guidelines. For example, PRINcI-
PLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION, supra note 161, Part A, pt. 5 states that "the
principles set forth herein and internal office procedures adopted pursuant to
them.., are not intended to, and do not,... create a right or benefit, substantive
or procedural, enforceable at law by a party to litigation with the U.S."
267. JuDIciARY Comm. REPORT, supra note 143, at 54. The Senate Judiciary
Committee made this point in supporting its denial of judicial review of
prosecutorial applications of S. 1722 § 205 - guidelines for the exercise of concur-
rent federal jurisdiction. See supra note 197.
268. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. It should be noted, how-
ever, that as DOJ guidelines become more specific, they will provide courts with
clearer standards for review of prosecutorial application. VORENBERG, CHARGING,
BARGAINING, AND CONTROL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE GROWTH OF PROSECUTORIAL
POWER 65-67 (Feb. 3, 1981) (draft).
269. Vorenberg, supra note 14, at 682-83.
270. ABRAMS, supra note 75, at 61-62. Abrams points out that "outside the con-
text of a criminal case, judicial review that challenges prosecutorial policy ...
does not pose a serious danger [of clogging the federal courts]." Abrams, supra
note 133, at 52.
V. CONCLUSION
The broad discretion of federal prosecutors to develop law en-
forcement policy in the local corruption context is inconsistent
with fundamental notions of federalism and separation of powers.
The uncontrolled exercise of such discretion undermines the fair-
ness of the criminal justice system. The federal courts must limit
prosecutorial discretion by refusing to validate expansive inter-
pretation of federal statutes that promote policies that Congress
may not endorse. Congress must not shirk its legislative respon-
sibility to define the proper role of the federal government in
criminal law enforcement. If Congress concludes that broad fed-
eral concurrent jurisdiction over local corruption is required, it
must provide guidelines for the exercise of that jurisdiction. The
Department of Justice must control the residual discretion of lo-
cal federal prosecutors with specific public guidelines to be imple-
mented within a rational administrative structure.
The intervention of federal law enforcement officials to protect
the integrity of state and local government appears to be desira-
ble in some situations. However, the decision to intervene must
not be committed, de facto, to the uncontrolled discretion of fed-
eral prosecutors.
